

PROCUREMENT RISK MANAGEMENT AT UIN IMAM BONJOL PADANG

ARDI

Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi KBP, Padang, Indonesia
E-mail: ardisikumbang1@gmail.com

SUHELMI HELIA

Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi KBP, Padang, Indonesia
E-mail: suhelmiheliah@akbpstie.ac.id

LAYNITA SARI

Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi KBP, Padang, Indonesia
E-mail: laynitasari@akbpstie.ac.id

AFRIYENI

Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi KBP, Padang, Indonesia
E-mail: afriyeni.yen@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Public procurement is a strategic university-governance function that directly affects service delivery and the use of institutional resources. This study examined procurement risks, current risk-management practices, and their contribution to effectiveness and efficiency at Universitas Islam Negeri Imam Bonjol Padang. A descriptive qualitative case-study design was used. Data were obtained through in-depth interviews with seven purposively selected key informants representing budget authority, commitment-making, payment authorization, supplier selection, suppliers, procurement management, and financial management. The data were condensed, displayed, compared across sources, and verified through source and method triangulation. The findings showed that strategic, technical, administrative, procedural, operational, coordination, and financial risks occurred across the procurement cycle. Although each actor applied role-specific controls, risk management remained fragmented, experience-based, and unsupported by an institution-wide risk register. Integrated risk documentation, clearer ownership, stronger cross-unit coordination, and continuous monitoring are therefore required to improve procurement timeliness, goal attainment, and resource efficiency.

Keyword: public procurement; risk management; effectiveness; efficiency; higher education

INTRODUCTION

Public procurement is more than an administrative mechanism for purchasing goods, services, and works. In a public university, it connects institutional planning, budget execution, academic support, infrastructure, and public accountability. A procurement process that delivers the required output at the expected quality, cost, and time supports teaching, research, student services, and administrative continuity. Conversely, weak specifications, delayed supplier selection, contract deviations, incomplete payment documents, and poor coordination can interrupt services and reduce the value obtained from public expenditure.

The scale of public procurement makes these risks institutionally significant. The World Bank (2020) estimated that regulated public procurement represented approximately 12% of global gross domestic product in 2018. This scale creates a strong incentive for public organizations to improve planning, competition, transparency, contract management, and oversight. In Indonesia, government procurement is governed by Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2018, as subsequently amended, most recently by Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2025 (Republic of Indonesia, 2025). The framework emphasizes efficient, effective, transparent, open, competitive, fair, and accountable procurement. These principles require more than formal compliance: they require systematic attention to uncertainty throughout the procurement cycle.

Risk management provides a structured approach for anticipating events that may prevent procurement objectives from being achieved. ISO 31000 describes a process of identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, reviewing, recording, and communicating risk within an organization's governance and decision-making arrangements (International Organization for Standardization [ISO], 2018). Applied to procurement, this approach helps decision makers recognize dependencies between need identification, specifications, supplier selection, contracting, delivery, acceptance, payment, and evaluation. A weakness at an early stage may migrate downstream; an unclear need can become an inaccurate specification, a contract variation, a delivery delay, an administrative dispute, or a cost overrun.

The higher-education setting intensifies this interdependence. Public universities procure heterogeneous outputs, including information-technology equipment, laboratory facilities, construction, professional services, security, cleaning, catering, transport, and other operational services. Requirements originate from different academic and administrative units, while procurement and payment responsibilities are distributed across officials with distinct authorities. Procurement performance therefore depends on timely information, realistic scheduling, technical competence, reliable electronic systems, documentary discipline, and coordination across organizational boundaries. Studies cited in the original manuscript similarly associate public-sector procurement problems with weak planning, limited implementation capacity, uneven use of e-procurement, and inadequate internal control (Mulyadi & Wibowo, 2021; Rahmawati & Firmansyah, 2023; Yuliana & Susanti, 2022).

Preliminary observations and internal reports for 2024 indicated recurring procurement problems at Universitas Islam Negeri Imam Bonjol Padang (UIN Imam Bonjol Padang). These included procurement plans that were not consistently based on the strategic needs of work units, delayed delivery by suppliers, goods that did not conform to technical specifications, and limited systematic documentation of risks and follow-up actions. The pattern suggested that difficulties were not isolated incidents. Rather, they reflected vulnerabilities across planning, supplier selection, contract execution, administration, payment, and organizational learning.

Previous studies have examined construction procurement risk, supplier selection, electronic procurement, and public-sector risk controls (Dita, 2020; Jiang et al., 2018; Puspita, 2018; Susilowati & Wibowo, 2023). Other research has found that operational risk controls may exist without being integrated into a formal organization-wide system (Fairuz & Lumban Batu, 2024; Nafi'ah, 2023; Sinurat & Purwanto, 2024). However, limited attention has been given to how the principal actors in a public university interpret risks from their different functional positions and how those distributed practices collectively affect procurement effectiveness and efficiency. Examining multiple roles within one procurement system can reveal both local controls and gaps between them.

This study addressed that gap through an institutional case study of UIN Imam Bonjol Padang. It pursued three objectives: first, to identify the principal risks occurring across the university's procurement cycle; second, to analyze how procurement actors currently manage those risks; and third, to explain how risk management contributes to procurement effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness refers to the achievement of procurement objectives, including fitness for purpose, quality, compliance, and timeliness.

Efficiency refers to the prudent use of time, budget, and administrative effort in producing those results. The study is expected to support a shift from reactive problem solving toward an integrated, documented, and continuously reviewed procurement-risk system.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Public Procurement Governance

Public procurement converts approved plans and public budgets into goods, services, and works. Its performance must therefore be assessed through both procedural integrity and achieved value. Compliance is necessary because procurement involves delegated authority and public funds, but compliance alone does not guarantee that an institution receives the correct output on time or avoids avoidable administrative cost. Effective procurement aligns needs, specifications, selection methods, contracts, supervision, acceptance, payment, and evaluation. Efficient procurement minimizes unnecessary delay, rework, waste, and transaction cost without reducing quality or accountability.

Research on public organizations identifies planning as a recurring source of procurement vulnerability. When needs are inadequately defined, specifications may be ambiguous or overly restrictive, schedules may be unrealistic, and budgets may not reflect market or implementation conditions. These deficiencies can reduce competition, generate clarification or objection, require contract modification, delay delivery, and complicate payment. Wulandari (2020) and Mulyadi and Wibowo (2021) associate procurement effectiveness in higher education with the quality of planning, implementer competence, system use, and internal control. Construction and infrastructure studies likewise show that risks are interconnected across stages rather than confined to contract execution (Dita, 2020; Safitri, 2024).

Electronic procurement can improve traceability, standardization, and access to information. It can also reduce face-to-face discretion and create an auditable record of transactions. Nevertheless, digitalization does not eliminate risk. Inaccurate data entered into a platform, user unfamiliarity, system interruptions, and poorly designed workflows can transfer existing weaknesses into electronic form. Susilowati and Wibowo (2023) and Lestari (2023) argue that e-procurement produces better results when it is integrated with risk controls, capable personnel, and monitoring. Digital records are useful only when responsibilities, data quality, and follow-up mechanisms are clear.

Risk Management in Procurement

Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives. This definition emphasizes that risk should be evaluated in relation to intended results, not merely as a list of adverse events. Under ISO 31000, risk management should be integrated with governance, strategy, planning, reporting, policies, values, and culture (ISO, 2018). It should be structured, comprehensive, customized to context, inclusive of relevant stakeholders, dynamic, informed by the best available evidence, attentive to human and cultural factors, and continually improved.

For procurement, the framework implies a recurring process. The institution establishes the scope and criteria; identifies events and causes; analyzes likelihood, consequences, and existing controls; evaluates priorities; selects treatment; assigns ownership; and monitors residual risk. Communication, consultation, recording, and reporting support every stage. A risk register is a practical instrument for documenting this

process. It normally records the risk statement, causes, consequences, existing controls, assessment, owner, treatment, target date, indicators, and residual exposure. The register does not replace professional judgment, but it creates organizational memory and makes responsibilities reviewable.

Procurement risks may be grouped into strategic, technical, procedural, administrative, operational, coordination, system, integrity, and financial categories. Strategic risk includes misalignment between organizational priorities, needs, budgets, and schedules. Technical risk concerns incomplete requirements, inaccurate specifications, and quality failures. Procedural risk involves selection errors, objections, or noncompliance. Administrative risk includes incomplete or inconsistent records. Operational risk arises during contract performance, delivery, inspection, or acceptance. Coordination risk concerns delayed information and unclear decisions across units. System risk includes electronic-platform disruption and user error. Financial risk covers cost escalation, delayed payment, and inefficient budget realization.

The categories overlap. For example, a poorly specified need is initially a planning and technical risk. It may later create a procedural challenge during selection, an operational problem during delivery, a financial effect through variation or rework, and a reputational consequence for the institution. Studies using procurement-risk frameworks stress the importance of prioritizing causal risk agents and designing treatments before failure occurs (Puspita, 2018; Setyaningsih, 2022). Other studies emphasize resilient supplier selection and the use of multiple criteria rather than price alone (Jiang et al., 2018).

Effectiveness and Efficiency as Procurement Outcomes

Effectiveness and efficiency are related but distinct. Effective procurement supplies what the institution needs, at the required quality and time, through a lawful and accountable process. Efficient procurement uses the least reasonable amount of time, financial resources, and administrative effort to obtain that result. A fast process that produces unsuitable goods is not effective; a compliant process burdened by preventable rework and delay is not efficient. Public-sector efficiency therefore concerns the relationship between resources used and outputs achieved, while effectiveness concerns the degree to which intended objectives are realized (Mardiasmo, 2018).

Risk management contributes to effectiveness by improving the reliability of specifications, schedules, selection decisions, contracts, supervision, and corrective action. It contributes to efficiency by preventing repeated document correction, avoidable tender delay, idle time, contract disruption, cost escalation, and late payment. The relationship is not automatically causal in a qualitative case study; rather, it is observed through mechanisms reported by actors and supported by process evidence. This distinction guides the interpretation of the findings: the study identifies how controls support outcomes, not a quantified effect size.

Risk Ownership and Organizational Learning

An integrated system depends on ownership. A risk owner must have sufficient authority to monitor exposure, implement or coordinate treatment, and escalate matters that exceed the role's control. Procurement complicates ownership because causes and consequences often cross functional boundaries. The proposing unit may own the quality of its need statement; technical personnel may own specification

validation; the PPK may own contract controls; the selection group may own procedural controls; and financial officers may own payment verification. A shared risk may therefore require one accountable owner and several control owners rather than an undefined collective responsibility.

Organizational learning is equally important. Monitoring should generate information about which risks occurred, which early indicators were useful, whether controls operated as designed, and what residual problems remained. Post-procurement evaluation can then update checklists, standard clauses, planning assumptions, supplier-performance information, training cases, and risk criteria. Without this feedback loop, organizations repeatedly solve familiar problems as if they were new. A concise, consistently used record allows experience to accumulate across procurement packages and staff changes.

RESEARCH METHODS

Research Design and Setting

The study used a descriptive qualitative case-study design to examine procurement risk management within its institutional context. The unit of analysis was the procurement process at UIN Imam Bonjol Padang, from planning and supplier selection through contract execution, payment, monitoring, and evaluation. A qualitative design was appropriate because the research questions concerned how actors identified risk, how controls were applied in practice, where coordination gaps occurred, and how those practices were perceived to influence effectiveness and efficiency.

Participants and Sampling

Informants were selected through criterion-based purposive sampling. The criterion was direct involvement in, responsibility for, or informed interaction with procurement risk and control. Seven key informants represented complementary positions: the Budget User Authority (Kuasa Pengguna Anggaran/KPA), Commitment-Making Officer (Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen/PPK), Payment Order Authorizing Officer (Pejabat Penandatangan Surat Perintah Membayar/PPSPM), Selection Working Group or Procurement Officer, supplier, Procurement Management Officer, and Planning and Financial Management Officer. Reporting participants by role preserved functional context while avoiding unnecessary personal identification.

Data Collection

Primary data were collected through in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The interview guide addressed risk sources, consequences, existing controls, decision-making, documentation, coordination, electronic systems, budget realization, and perceived effects on procurement outcomes. Interviews allowed follow-up questions when informants described specific stages or incidents. Method triangulation was supported by observation of procurement practices and review of relevant internal information and process documents available to the researcher. The analysis did not treat a single statement as sufficient evidence for an institution-wide conclusion; accounts were compared across roles and against process evidence.

Data Analysis and Trustworthiness

Analysis followed an iterative sequence of data condensation, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification. Interview material was organized by informant role and coded into recurring categories:

planning and strategic alignment; specifications and contract control; selection procedure; payment administration; supplier execution; coordination; system use; organizational documentation; and budget control. Related codes were then consolidated into broader risk categories and compared across procurement stages.

The researcher used a role-by-theme matrix to identify convergence, differences in perspective, and handoff points between actors. Source triangulation compared statements from internal officials, the supplier, and procurement and financial managers. Method triangulation compared interview accounts with observations and available records. Preliminary interpretations were repeatedly checked against the data to avoid extending claims beyond the evidence. Because this was a single-institution qualitative study with seven role-based informants, the findings provide analytical insight into processes and mechanisms; they do not estimate statistical prevalence or causal effect sizes.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Initial Procurement Problems

The initial review identified recurring problems across several procurement types. Table 1 summarizes the issues recorded in the source manuscript. They include specification and quality mismatches, delayed completion, weak performance monitoring, contract nonconformity, unprofessional service delivery, procedural weaknesses, construction delay, discrepancies between plans and implementation, and weaknesses in internal control. These problems provided a starting point for the interviews rather than a quantitative frequency distribution.

Table 1. Recurring Procurement Problems at UIN Imam Bonjol Padang

No.	Procurement type	Examples	Recurring problems
1	Goods	Computers, desks, air conditioners, projectors, laptops, and printers	Items fail to meet technical specifications; specification-entry errors
2	Consulting services	Building planning and supervision; internal audit services	Delayed deliverables; limited performance monitoring
3	Other services	Cleaning, security, catering, and vehicle rental	Contract nonconformity; unprofessional personnel; procedural weaknesses; no supplier-performance evaluation
4	Construction	Classroom or laboratory construction	Work delay; discrepancies among the budget plan, drawings, and field conditions
5	Audit observations	Cross-unit procurement of goods and services	Mismatch between planning and realization; weak internal control; insufficient oversight, creating inefficiency and budget risk

Source: UIN Imam Bonjol Padang Procurement Unit (source manuscript).

Table 1 shows that risk manifestations varied by procurement object, but several causes recurred. In goods procurement, inaccurate input or insufficient validation of technical specifications could lead to unsuitable outputs. In consulting and other services, weak monitoring increased the chance that timeliness, professionalism, or contractual service levels would not be met. Construction combined scheduling, technical, and supervision risks. Cross-unit audit observations indicated deeper issues involving consistency between plans and implementation and the effectiveness of internal controls. The pattern supports the view

that procurement risk is systemic: weaknesses in planning and control influence later stages and may appear in different forms.

Findings by Informant Role

Budget User Authority: Strategic Alignment and Oversight

The KPA described procurement risk primarily as a strategic planning and accountability issue. Procurement effectiveness was considered dependent on aligning work-unit needs with the available budget and implementation calendar. Requests that were prepared as repetitions of prior-year activities, without current needs analysis, were more likely to require adjustment or to be delayed. The KPA explained:

“The main procurement risks usually arise during planning, especially when the needs proposed by a work unit are not fully aligned with the available budget and implementation time.”

This account indicates that risk treatment begins before a selection method or supplier is chosen. The KPA's controls included prioritizing needs, coordinating with proposing units, monitoring implementation, and evaluating results. Rapid leadership decisions were sometimes required when time or budget constraints threatened essential activities. Such decisions supported continuity, but reliance on intervention after a problem emerged also suggested that preventive planning controls could be strengthened. A documented escalation rule and risk-based prioritization criteria would make strategic decisions more consistent and reviewable.

Commitment-Making Officer: Specifications, Contracts, and Supervision

The PPK identified inaccurate or incomplete specifications and supplier delay as the most prominent technical and contractual risks. Specifications sometimes failed to capture actual field requirements because users had not defined needs in sufficient detail. Differences between procurement documents and implementation conditions then appeared after the contract had begun. The PPK stated:

“Specification risk generally arises because user requirements were not explained in sufficient detail at the beginning, so differences between the documents and actual field conditions are discovered during implementation.”

The PPK treated clear clauses, schedules, quality standards, delay sanctions, and routine supervision as the principal controls. Contract terms allocated obligations and provided a formal basis for correction. Supervision served both preventive and corrective purposes: early detection could prevent a minor deviation from becoming a larger delay or quality failure. The informant also viewed e-Catalog version 6 as improving transparency because supplier selection, ordering, contracting, signatures, and payment activities were increasingly recorded electronically. The benefit, however, depended on accurate entries and user competence. Digital traceability reduced some administrative exposure but did not remedy an unclear requirement.

Payment Order Authorizing Officer: Administrative Completeness

The PPSPM viewed documentary accuracy and completeness as prerequisites for timely payment. Payment orders could not be processed when supporting documents were missing, inconsistent, or

procedurally incorrect. Returned files increased administrative effort and extended the time between completion and payment. The informant summarized the control problem as follows:

“A payment order cannot be processed if the documents are incomplete or contain administrative errors; payment must be postponed until the requirements have been fulfilled.”

The finding demonstrates how administrative risk becomes an efficiency problem. Repeated correction consumes staff time, delays supplier cash flow, and may affect continuing performance. The PPSPM's controls consisted of checking document completeness, enforcing requirements, and coordinating with the PPK and relevant units. A standardized pre-submission checklist, clear document ownership, and early verification before the payment stage would move control upstream and reduce rework.

Selection Working Group or Procurement Officer: Procedural and System Risk

The selection informant highlighted objections from participants, incomplete bid documents, SPSE system constraints, and limited user familiarity. Objections could arise from different interpretations of selection documents or dissatisfaction with evaluation results. Incomplete bids led to disqualification and could weaken competition. System disruption or user difficulty could slow evaluation and decision-making. The informant noted:

“If the selection process is delayed, the following stages also move backward, affecting the overall procurement schedule.”

These risks directly affected timeliness. The main controls were clear selection documents, consistent evaluation, transparent communication, procedural compliance, and capable use of the electronic system. The finding is consistent with the literature that electronic procurement improves accountability only when process design, data quality, infrastructure, and user capacity are managed together (Lestari, 2023; Susilowati & Wibowo, 2023). Contingency arrangements for system interruptions and early document review would further reduce schedule exposure.

Supplier: Change, Payment, and Coordination

The supplier described risk from the external implementation perspective. Changes to specifications after contract signature created adjustments in method, schedule, and operating cost. Payment delay was linked to incomplete administration, while slow communication postponed decisions needed to resolve field conditions. The informant emphasized:

“Coordination is essential; when communication is slow, resolving problems in the field is also delayed.”

This perspective shows that a contract is not a self-executing control. Its effectiveness depends on consistent instructions, authorized communication, timely decisions, inspection, and payment administration. Changes may sometimes be unavoidable, but they require controlled assessment, approval, documentation, and evaluation of their time and cost implications. A named communication channel and response-time expectation would reduce ambiguity and help the PPK maintain an auditable record of decisions.

Procurement Management Officer: Organizational System and Capability

The Procurement Management Officer identified a central institutional weakness: risk was managed through experience and periodic evaluation, but no formal procurement risk register consolidated risks, controls, owners, treatments, and follow-up. The informant stated:

“Procurement risks have generally been managed through experience and activity evaluation; a formal risk register has not yet been prepared.”

Monitoring, evaluation, and staff development were the main organization-level controls. Training was considered necessary because regulatory understanding, procedural competence, and electronic-system capability influenced the likelihood of error. The absence of a formal register meant that learning could remain with individuals rather than become institutional memory. It also limited management's ability to compare risk across packages, identify repeated causes, and assess whether treatment had reduced residual exposure. This gap is consistent with studies reporting that public organizations often apply local operational controls before establishing integrated risk governance (Fairuz & Lumban Batu, 2024; Nafi'ah, 2023; Sinurat & Purwanto, 2024).

Planning and Financial Management Officer: Budget Exposure and Control

The financial-management informant associated cost escalation with weak planning, changing requirements, delay, and contract adjustment. Periodic comparison between planned and realized expenditure was used to maintain compliance and prevent waste. The informant observed:

“With sound budget control, procurement funds can be used efficiently and directed to their intended purposes.”

Budget monitoring supported financial accountability, but the finding again showed the dependence between stages. Monitoring expenditure after commitment is necessary, yet stronger need validation, realistic cost estimates, and controlled change earlier in the cycle are more preventive. Financial efficiency should not be interpreted simply as spending less or maximizing budget absorption. It requires obtaining the required result at a reasonable total cost while avoiding preventable delay, rework, and quality loss.

Cross-Role Data Matrix

The role-by-theme matrix in Table 2 condenses the evidence and demonstrates how each actor encountered a different portion of the same procurement system.

Table 2. Role-by-Theme Matrix of Research Findings

No.	Informant	Analytical focus	Principal sub-findings
1	KPA	Policy and strategic decisions	Budget-planning risk; strategic delay; leadership policy; control and evaluation
2	PPK	Specifications and contract	Specification mismatch; supplier delay; contract clauses; implementation supervision
3	PPSPM	Payment administration	Delayed payment order; document error; effects on procurement lead time
4	Selection group/officer	Supplier-selection procedure	Objections; incomplete bids; SPSE constraints; selection delay

No.	Informant	Analytical focus	Principal sub-findings
5	Supplier	Contract execution and coordination	Specification change; delayed payment; communication and coordination barriers
6	PBJ manager	Procurement system and SOP	No formal risk register; monitoring and evaluation; staff development
7	Planning/finance manager	Budget control	Cost escalation; realization control; efficient use of procurement funds

Source: Primary data analyzed by the researcher, 2026.

The matrix reveals both coverage and fragmentation. The actors collectively addressed planning, specifications, selection, contracting, payment, supplier performance, systems, capability, and budget control. However, responsibility for individual controls did not automatically create an integrated view of end-to-end risk. Handoffs between roles—such as the transfer of user needs into specifications, contract evidence into payment documents, or monitoring results into future planning—were particularly important. A formal register and recurring cross-unit review could connect these local controls.

Procurement Process and Points of Risk

Figure 1 presents the procurement sequence reconstructed from the source manuscript. It is a simplified process map rather than a complete legal workflow. Its purpose is to show how a risk or control at one stage may influence subsequent stages.




Figure 1. Simplified Procurement Process at UIN Imam Bonjol Padang

Planning establishes the required output, budget, technical criteria, and schedule. Supplier selection translates those requirements into a competitive decision. Contracting formalizes scope, quality, price, time, obligations, and remedies. Contract execution requires supervision, communication, and evidence of performance. Payment depends on technical acceptance and administrative completeness. Monitoring and evaluation should then feed lessons into later planning. When evaluation is not documented or linked to future decisions, the cycle loses an important learning mechanism.

Multidimensional Risk Across the Procurement Cycle

The first research objective was to identify major procurement risks. The evidence showed that risk was multidimensional and distributed. Strategic risk was concentrated in need and budget planning. Technical risk appeared in specifications and conformity of outputs. Procedural risk emerged during supplier selection and objection handling. Administrative risk occurred in bid and payment documents. Operational and coordination risks appeared during contract execution. System risk affected electronic selection and transaction processes. Financial risk involved cost escalation, inefficient resource use, and delayed payment.

This distribution supports previous findings that public procurement risk is systemic and stage-linked (Dita, 2020; Puspita, 2018; Safitri, 2024; Wulandari, 2020). It also cautions against treating problems only at the point where they become visible. A payment delay may be recorded at the end of the process, although its cause could be an unclear responsibility or missing evidence created during contract execution. A

specification change may appear operational, although it originated in incomplete need analysis. Effective mitigation therefore requires causal analysis and coordination across stages.

The results also demonstrate the role of human and organizational factors. Competence, attention to documentation, communication speed, and accumulated experience influenced control performance. These factors are consistent with the ISO 31000 principle that human and cultural characteristics materially affect risk management (ISO, 2018). Training is important, but it must be supported by usable procedures, clear accountability, reliable data, and management review. Otherwise, trained individuals may continue working within a fragmented system.

Current Risk-Management Practice: Present but Fragmented

The second objective was to analyze current practices. Every informant described controls: prioritization, procedural compliance, contract clauses, supervision, document checking, electronic records, monitoring, evaluation, training, and budget comparison. These practices indicate that risk management was not absent. Rather, it was embedded in separate roles and often activated when a known problem arose.

The absence of an institution-wide procurement risk register was therefore the defining gap. Without a common register, the institution could not readily see whether the same cause recurred across packages, whether ownership was complete, whether treatments were implemented on schedule, or whether residual risk remained acceptable. Experience-based control is valuable, but it is vulnerable to staff turnover and inconsistent interpretation. A register would convert tacit knowledge into a reviewable organizational asset.

Integration should not be equated with adding paperwork. A useful register would be concise, linked to existing planning and monitoring, and proportionate to package complexity. High-value, high-complexity, or time-critical procurements may require detailed assessment, while routine low-risk purchases may use a standard checklist. The practical objective is to improve decisions and handoffs. Risk documentation that is not used in meetings, approvals, supervision, or evaluation would become a compliance burden rather than a control.

The findings align with ISO 31000's emphasis on integration and continual improvement (ISO, 2018). They also support public-sector studies in which operational controls existed but institutional integration remained incomplete (Fairuz & Lumban Batu, 2024; Nafi'ah, 2023; Rahmandana, 2025; Sinurat & Purwanto, 2024). UIN Imam Bonjol Padang can build on its existing role-specific practices rather than replacing them. The priority is to connect them through shared risk criteria, documented ownership, escalation, monitoring, and learning.

Contribution to Effectiveness and Efficiency

The third objective concerned the contribution of risk management to procurement outcomes. The qualitative evidence identified plausible mechanisms. Clear specifications and careful need validation improved the likelihood that outputs would be fit for purpose. Transparent selection documents and consistent evaluation reduced procedural dispute. Contract clauses and supervision supported quality and schedule control. Document checks and early coordination supported timely payment. Budget monitoring

reduced the likelihood that unplanned changes would undermine resource allocation. Electronic records improved traceability and facilitated oversight.

These mechanisms support effectiveness by protecting quality, timeliness, compliance, and goal attainment. They support efficiency by reducing document return, repeated work, avoidable delay, uncontrolled change, and cost escalation. Studies of procurement risk similarly associate early identification and treatment with more reliable supplier selection, contract performance, and resource use (Acebes et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2018; Setyaningsih, 2022). The present study does not quantify savings or establish a statistical effect. Its contribution is to explain how actors perceived and experienced the link between controls and outcomes.

The findings also show that effectiveness and efficiency may conflict if considered narrowly. Accelerating a process without adequate checks can create quality or compliance risk; adding excessive approvals can reduce timeliness without improving control. Risk-based proportionality offers a solution. Controls should be designed according to likelihood, consequence, complexity, value, urgency, and control reliability. This approach directs greater attention to material exposure while allowing routine transactions to proceed through standardized pathways.

Proposed Institutional Strengthening

Four connected improvements emerge from the findings. First, the university should establish a procurement risk register covering the end-to-end cycle. The register should state each risk as a cause-event-consequence relationship; identify existing controls; assess likelihood and consequence; assign an owner; specify treatment, due date, and indicator; and record residual risk. Procurement management can maintain the common methodology, while the relevant official owns each treatment.

Second, risk review should be integrated into existing decision points. Need validation should occur before procurement planning is finalized; specification review should involve competent users and technical personnel; selection documents should be checked for clarity; contract-start meetings should confirm communication and evidence requirements; payment checklists should be agreed before completion; and post-procurement evaluation should inform future planning and supplier-performance records.

Third, the institution should strengthen cross-unit coordination. A concise periodic forum involving planning, KPA, PPK, selection, PBJ management, finance, and internal control can review material risks and overdue treatments. The forum should focus on decisions and accountability, not duplicate operational reporting. Clear escalation thresholds—for example, forecast delay, material specification change, repeated document return, or expected cost impact—would support timely leadership intervention.

Fourth, capacity development and digital information should reinforce each other. Training should use recurring institutional cases, not only regulatory summaries. Electronic systems should capture the information required for control and follow-up. Dashboards may show package stage, critical risk, owner, treatment status, schedule variance, document readiness, and supplier-performance issues. These measures would turn dispersed experience into organizational learning and support transparent, evidence-based management.

Implementation should be phased. In the first phase, procurement management and relevant units can agree on a common risk vocabulary, a simple likelihood-consequence scale, escalation thresholds, and a pilot register for several material packages. In the second phase, the institution can review pilot use, remove fields that do not support decisions, and integrate the register with procurement planning, contract monitoring, and payment readiness. In the third phase, management can analyze recurring causes and treatment performance across packages. This sequence reduces the risk that an elaborate form is introduced before officials understand how it should improve decisions.

Useful indicators should combine process and outcome measures. Process indicators may include the proportion of material packages with reviewed risks, overdue treatments, repeated document returns, unresolved specification questions, or packages without named owners. Outcome indicators may include schedule variance, acceptance defects, contract modifications, payment lead time, supplier-performance findings, and avoidable cost effects. Indicators should be interpreted with context: a higher number of reported risks may initially indicate better identification rather than poorer performance. Management review should therefore focus on materiality, treatment quality, trends, and learning rather than rewarding artificially low risk counts.

CONCLUSION

This study found that procurement risk at UIN Imam Bonjol Padang was multidimensional and present throughout planning, supplier selection, contracting, execution, payment, and evaluation. Strategic misalignment, unclear specifications, supplier delay, objections, incomplete documents, electronic-system constraints, contract change, slow coordination, payment delay, weak risk documentation, and budget exposure were interconnected rather than isolated. A weakness at one stage often created consequences in later stages.

Risk management was already practiced through role-specific controls, including prioritization, procedural compliance, contract clauses, supervision, document verification, electronic traceability, monitoring, staff development, and budget comparison. Nevertheless, practice remained fragmented and substantially dependent on individual experience. The absence of a formal, institution-wide procurement risk register limited shared visibility, consistent ownership, follow-up, and organizational learning.

The evidence indicates that risk management supports effectiveness by protecting fitness for purpose, quality, compliance, timeliness, and achievement of procurement objectives. It supports efficiency by reducing preventable rework, delay, uncontrolled change, administrative effort, and budget exposure. These are qualitative mechanisms rather than quantified causal estimates. The managerial implication is that UIN Imam Bonjol Padang should integrate existing controls through a proportionate risk register, risk review at key decision points, explicit ownership and escalation, stronger cross-unit coordination, and monitoring linked to future planning.

The study has limitations. It examined one institution and relied on seven role-based informants; therefore, the findings should not be generalized statistically to all public universities. The study did not quantify risk likelihood, financial loss, cycle-time reduction, or the comparative effectiveness of individual

controls. Future research should combine qualitative process analysis with procurement records, cycle-time and cost indicators, supplier-performance data, or quantitative risk methods such as the House of Risk or DEMATEL. Comparative and longitudinal studies could assess how integrated risk registers and digital monitoring change procurement outcomes over time.

REFERENCES

- Acebes, F., Curto, D., de Antón, J., & Villafañez, F. (2024). Análisis cuantitativo de riesgos utilizando “MCSimulRisk” como herramienta didáctica. *Revista de Ingeniería*, 12(1), 45–59.
- Dita, A. O. F. (2020). Risks of public procurement for construction works. *International Journal of Construction Management*, 20(3), 230–242.
- Fairuz, A. H., & Lumban Batu, R. (2024). Analisis penerapan manajemen risiko pengadaan barang atau jasa pada badan usaha milik daerah. *Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis*, 16(1), 67–80.
- International Organization for Standardization. (2018). *ISO 31000:2018 risk management – Guidelines*. <https://www.iso.org/standard/65694.html>
- Jiang, D., Hassan, M. M., Faiz, T. I., & Alam, M. N. (2018). A possibility distribution-based multi-criteria decision algorithm for resilient supplier selection problems. *Expert Systems with Applications*, 101, 160–174.
- Lestari, D. (2023). Pengaruh integrasi manajemen risiko dan sistem e-procurement terhadap efisiensi proses pengadaan. *Jurnal Manajemen dan Teknologi*, 15(2), 112–125.
- Mardiasmo. (2018). *Akuntansi sektor publik*. Andi.
- Mulyadi, M., & Wibowo, T. S. (2021). Analisis efektivitas proses pengadaan barang dan jasa di sektor pendidikan tinggi negeri. *Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Negara*, 11(2), 101–112.
- Nafi'ah, K. (2023). Implementasi manajemen risiko pada fungsi pengadaan barang dan jasa: Studi kasus pada Balai Pelaksana Pemilihan Jasa Konstruksi Kementerian PUPR. *Jurnal Kebijakan Publik*, 12(3), 134–145.
- Puspita, H. D. (2018). Analisis dan mitigasi risiko pada proses pengadaan barang dan jasa dengan pendekatan metode House of Risk (HOR) di PT Industri Kereta Api (Persero). *Jurnal Teknik Industri*, 11(4), 98–110.
- Rahmandana, P. D. (2025). Analisis risiko proses pengadaan barang dan jasa pada Unit Procurement and Fixed Asset PT Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk. *Jurnal Manajemen Proyek*, 7(1), 77–90.
- Rahmawati, D., & Firmansyah, H. (2023). Tantangan pengadaan barang dan jasa di perguruan tinggi negeri wilayah Sumatera: Perspektif manajemen risiko. *Jurnal Manajemen dan Kebijakan Publik*, 12(2), 134–145.
- Republic of Indonesia. (2025). *Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2025 concerning the second amendment to Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2018 on government procurement*. <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/318647/perpres-no-46-tahun-2025>
- Safitri, A. D. (2024). Analisis risiko terhadap proses pengadaan barang dan jasa infrastruktur berbasis masyarakat pada Direktorat X. *Jurnal Infrastruktur*, 9(2), 150–162.
- Setyaningsih, D. P. (2022). Kuantifikasi risiko pengadaan barang/jasa konstruksi menurut persepsi pejabat SKPD Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta. *Jurnal Manajemen Risiko*, 8(2), 123–135.
- Sinurat, J. A., & Purwanto, B. (2024). Analisis manajemen risiko conflict of interest pada pengadaan barang/jasa Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB). *Jurnal Administrasi Publik*, 10(1), 45–59.
- Susilowati, E., & Wibowo, A. (2023). Penerapan manajemen risiko dan e-procurement dalam meningkatkan efektivitas dan efisiensi pengadaan di pemerintahan. *Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis*, 16(1), 21–35.
- World Bank. (2020, March 23). *Global Public Procurement Database: Share, compare, improve*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/03/23/global-public-procurement-database-share-compare-improve>
- Wulandari, R. (2020). *Evaluasi sistem pengadaan barang/jasa di Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) berbasis manajemen risiko* [Undergraduate thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada].
- Yuliana, D., & Susanti, E. (2022). Evaluasi implementasi manajemen risiko dalam sistem pengadaan instansi pemerintah daerah dan pendidikan tinggi. *Jurnal Kebijakan dan Manajemen Publik*, 9(3), 221–235.