THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN INDONESIA: Contestation and Resolution of Religious Conflicts in The New Order Age

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Abstract

Social conflicts in Indonesia are often associated with political turmoil and disappointment with the hegemony of power. Therefore, it is important to understand comprehensively how the dynamics of religious conflict in Indonesia, especially during the New Order era. As we know that this research is a literature study to understand the contestation of religious conflicts and how conflict resolution was implemented by the government in resolving ethnic-religious conflicts during the New Order era. Using qualitative methods, this study finds that there are several factors of ethnic and religious conflicts in Indonesia, especially during the New Order era, namely group identity conflicts, levels of chaos and social mobilization, repressive actions by power groups, and collective conflicts between communal groups. This study also shows that for the resolution of social conflicts, the government uses a repressive and security approach to control the community, and there is also a cultural approach from civil society as a form of resistance for the government. Civil society also plays an active role in promoting peace agreements between conflicting groups.

Keyword: *Conflict Resolution; Indonesia; New Order; Religious Conflict.*

Abstrak

Konflik sosial di Indonesia seringkali dikaitkan dengan kekacauan politik dan kekecewaan terhadap hegemoni kekuasaan. Karena itu, penting untuk memahami lebih komprehensif bagaimana dinamika konflik agama di Indonesia, khususnya pada masa Orde Baru. Sebagaimana kita ketahui bahwa. Penelitian ini merupakan studi kepustakaan untuk memahami kontestasi konflik agama dan bagaimana resolusi konflik yang diterapkan oleh pemerintah dalam penyelesaian konflik agama-etnis pada masa Orde Baru. Menggunakan metode kualitatif, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa ada beberapa faktor konflik etnis dan agama di Indonesia, khususnya pada masa Orde Baru, yaitu konflik identitas kelompok, tingkat kekacauan dan mobilisasi sosial, tindakan represif oleh kelompok kekuasaan, dan konflik kolektif diantara kelompok komunal. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa untuk penyelesaian konflik sosial, pemerintah menggunakan pendekatan represif dan keamanan untuk mengontrol masyarakat, dan juga ada pendekatan budaya dari masyarakat sipil sebagai salah satu perlawanan bagi pemerintah. Masyarakat sipil juga berperan aktif dalam mendorong kesepakatan damai antara kelompok-kelompok yang berkonflik.

Kata Kunci: Resolusi Konflik; Indonesia; Orde Baru; Konflik Agama.

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1.   INTRODUCTION

Development during the New Order era was directed at one main objective to pursue economic growth with the support of reliable stability. All policies are directed at how to mobilize resources by improving other dimensions that do not have a direct relationship with economic development to create stability (Karim, 1992). In this situation, political recruitment focuses heavily on figures who have sufficient capacity to design and manage economic-technics as well as figures with diplomatic abilities. This implies how little religion has played a role in the era of development. Religion seems to occupy a complementary and even marginal and peripheral position. Religion is often subordinated to economic development.

It is not surprising that the New Order development strategy focused on several things. First, economic development is the main target, and revitalize it so that it does not have a direct contribution to economic development. Second, political stability overcomes other considerations of interest as a prerequisite for economic development. Third, political recruitment prioritizes technical-economic considerations. Fourth, it is very pragmatically oriented, relativizes the idealist dimension to encourage the emergence of a consumerist, even hedonistic, culture. This situation is a logical consequence of the user strategy adopted by the New Order regime since its inception. This strategy emphasizes the concentration of power in the hands of the government, steady political stability, and high economic growth (Tebba, 1993).

The New Order government was the longest in power for approximately 32 years under the command of President Suharto (Hidayat, 2021; Muliono, 2020). During these three decades, many achievements and results have been made to build the nation's progress, but also many political and economic policies that have brought calamity to the entire Indonesian people. The growth without justice is a blurry portrait of development in these three decades. We can say that the development process that has been carried out has led to a process of marginalization and exploitation. The real evidence of the catastrophe stored in the ugliness of the New Order was repressive and militaristic actions to suppress conflicts so as not to disrupt national stability and promote economic development.

During the New Order regime, a series of conflicts and violence with the nuances of SARA occurred in Indonesia. In several regions in Indonesia, there have been many acts of violence triggered by issues of ethnicity and religion, which have disrupted the stability of domestic security, thus creating an increasingly violent escalation of violence. Political violence is a sensitive issue to take advantage of tribal, ethnic, and religious pluralism in achieving targets and goals for the sake of lasting power. Practices of political violence, which show an escalation of violence, create more worries when religion becomes thick events that lead to acts of violence. The political violence which was not concerned about religion was often drawn into the religious territory to gain more support from its adherents (Wahjusaputria, 2015).

Conflicts in the name of religion that occurred in several regions did not arise naturally without any underlying causes. The growing religious conflict is a continuation of the current political atmosphere and situation, which is rooted in something historical, produced by economic, political, and cultural distortions. It can be said that economic inequality influences the distribution of conflict in

Indonesia's social and religious life (Stewart, 2016). During the New Order era, as the regime that held power the longest, from the very beginning it had practiced state-based violence (structural violence). This state-based violence became more widespread by involving the masses at the end of the fall of the New Order regime, in which the state was increasingly open to practicing acts of violence, both vertical and horizontal violence (Fatah, 1999).

As a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious country, Indonesia is always haunted by the vulnerability of the threat of conflict with various backgrounds, ranging from identity-based, communal, separatist conflicts, struggling for access to natural resources to micro-scale conflicts such as brawls between youths, disputes between residents, and so on. Everything can cause extraordinary disaster if not managed properly by the government. Unfortunately, the New Order government allowed the conflict to drag on until, in the end, people of various ethnicities felt disappointed with its political policies which could not accommodate the aspirations of different national plurality.

The root of the conflict resulted from structural problems-economic and political power, which were latent throughout the New Order Era. Where the absence of inclusive policies in the economic, political, and social fields, which results in horizontal disparities between groups in the economy (wealth, employment, and income) as well as an imbalance of geographic benefits. From a political perspective, all-important groups in society may have never been involved in political power, government administration, and other bureaucratic powers (Stewart F. , 2005).

In this condition, there is a vicious cycle of violence that continues from the authoritarian political system to the New Order regime which is known to be repressive in responding to any acts of violence. Violence in the New Order was not an expression of momentary aggression, but rather rooted in down-to-earth symptoms and seemed to be buried because the people did not have enough open space to fight against the rule of the authoritarian regime. Centralized political, economic, and cultural policies during the New Order era were a political regime that successfully translated the Hobbesian and integralist concepts in the above meaning, and was assumed to have contributed greatly to the vertical and horizontal conflicts of the period afterward until now.

In practice, these policies are conditioned in a political atmosphere that is free from ideological conflicts and based on a consensus of values. In such a situation, the state implements pluralistic restrictions (limitations) on political participation so that the state must control and give legitimacy to military activities to take control so that there is no escalation of violence from the community below. There are main pillars of power exercised by the New Order to control the government, namely the politics of security and the politics of logistics. Security politics is the New Order approach to creating collective fear as the main weapon in engineering autocratic stability through repressive, coercive models, practices of political violence, and so on. Meanwhile, logistical politics is applied through minimal economic needs to replace the absence of political participation in the name of development politics as the main character for creating stability. So, the theory is that economic growth will immediately provide support for the democratization process in Indonesia (Fatah, 1999, pp. 8-9). For the authorities, the reality of ethnoreligious conflict is very important to be an

"optical tool" to understand the politics of harmony, especially the one played by the New Order government.

In Indonesia, communal-based conflicts are very prone to occur, because Indonesia is a multi-religious and ethnic country. Communal conflict can be understood as a form of conflict involving religious communities, or conflicts between religious and ethnic groups and other communities. Communal-based conflict does not only include a religious community with another religious community, but also is based on ethnicity, social class, and political affiliation between communities (Takdir, 2017). For example, conflicts and violence involving Dayak and Madurese ethnic that occurred in Kalimantan.

Ben Anderson, sees that the social conflicts during the New Order Era have historical roots and historical transformations of the formation of the nation-state in the past (Anderson, 2001). Reflecting on the variety and complexity of conflict issues, Indonesia has extraordinary experiences, it can even be said that it is very rich in having local knowledge and local values which can be the basic ingredients of local mechanisms for resolving conflicts and disputes that occur at the community level in the area urban community. The still-running of local mechanisms in resolving conflicts shows that the Indonesian nation still has strong social capital to solve conflict problems in its way, even to a degree of its uniqueness.

There are many studies on the dynamics and contestation of religious conflicts in Indonesia. Among the several studies conducted were related to religious conflicts during the New Order era, namely conflicts in Situbondo, Kalimantan, Maluku, Poso, and several other conflicts. Ayami Nakaya's research on ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan is the focus of the study with a multicultural education approach. This study examines the conflict between ethnic Madurese and Dayaks, who has a long history of struggle for natural resources and unresolved migration problems (Nakaya, 2018). In addition, research on ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan, especially in Pontianak, involves ethnic Dayak, Malay, and Chinese. This study found that the causes of conflict were the absence of an open mind in dealing with problems, the absence of mutual tolerance, and communication barriers that were the cause of inter-ethnic conflicts (Carissa, 2018). Another research on ethnic conflict during the New Order era in research on the impact of conflict in Sambas, West Kalimantan. This study shows that the impact of ethnic conflict in Sambas is causing moral, social problems, and a crisis of local wisdom values (Wahab, 2017). There is also research on ethnic, religious, racial, and inter-group conflicts that occur in Pontianak with a multicultural and religious-based approach (Muftihah, 2013).

There is another study on religious conflict during the New Order era, namely the religious conflict in Situbondo. The religious-based conflict in Situbondo has raised deep concerns for the security of this nation because the escalation of violence that has occurred has created deep-rooted religious sentiments in the community. As a result of the conflict, the church was damaged and burned by society. This research shows that integration and reconciliation have been carried out by religious leaders who are concerned with efforts to resolve conflicts. (Retnowati, 2014). In the case of the long, violent conflict in Ambon that led to the segregation of Christian and Muslim communities into separate spaces as a nation (Robinson, 2016).

Based on the results of the research above, this article aims to explain the dynamics of religious conflict in Indonesia during the New Order era. In addition, this article describes the conflict resolution used by the New Order government in dealing with various ethnic and religious conflicts involving many parties, both sectarian conflicts, and communal conflicts. The dynamics of religious conflict in the New Order certainly have different characteristics and styles from the Old Order government and the Reformation period and until now. This article focuses on religious conflicts in Situbondo, which are more political, ethnic, and religious, namely the anti-Christian and anti-Chinese riots in October 1996. Some of the conflicts studied in this study are ethnic conflicts that occurred in Kalimantan, both in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan. This study also describes the conflict resolution used by the New Order government, which used more security and political harmony approaches to control religious conflicts between community groups from various life backgrounds.

This study attempts to present conflict management during the New Order era which caused many casualties among the parties involved in the conflict, ranging from sectarian conflicts to communal conflicts between different religious groups. This research is expected to make an important contribution to academics in conducting further research on conflict management rooted in community traditions and culture without imposing the security and political harmony approach used by the New Order government so that it becomes a valuable lesson for the current government to prioritize the local wisdom approach compared to a coercive approach to security.

## 2.	RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
### 2.1.	The Dynamics of Religious Life in the New Order Period.

Before explaining the roots of the emergence of ethnic-religious conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms during the New Order era, we try to elaborate on a little commentary on the situation of religious life in Indonesia based on the political policies implemented to reduce the role of religion in maintaining the stability of national development. This is important because every situation in the life of the religious community is very dependent on the political policies carried out by the authorities in controlling society so as not to carry out rebellions and resistance regarding the participation of the public space in the New Order government structure.

Reading the situation in the life of religious communities during the New Order era did reveal a quite complicated problem, considering that the open space for religious communities was limited and supervised by the authorities at that time. As a result, religious expression and freedom of religion have not been fully guaranteed by the state as the control holder of all policies. Although this is regulated by Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution and the explanation of TAP MPR No. II/1978 concerning the Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila, which reads: "Religious freedom is one of the most human rights among human rights because religious freedom comes directly from human dignity as God's creature. The right to freedom of religion is not a gift from the state or a gift from certain groups, but it is truly a matter of individual freedom in obtaining their respective rights" (Effendi, 1998).

At that point, it was difficult to find a clear formula regarding the recognition and guarantee of the right to freedom in state life which was

controlled by the New Order regime. Religious human rights are something inherent in human life and are not bound by state policies to regulate the beliefs of their citizens. In the political life of the New Order, the situation in the life of religious people seemed to be controlled and at least perhaps they had to avoid conflicts of interest with certain religious groups. The New Order, with the concept of modernization, which has been running for about three decades, has carried out an overhaul of the religious structure in Indonesia. In the mid-1980s, the New Order conducted a systematic and structured weakening of various religious groups through desability and demonization of religious communities (Damm, 2018). By placing the condition of the state in a strong, hegemonic, and interventionist position, the state becomes a dominant force so that groups of people from various groups cannot disrupt domestic political stability.

In the dominant state situation, the position of society is getting weaker and tends to have to depend on the role of the state as the sole ruler in regulating policies concerning the life of religious communities in Indonesia. The various penetrations that have been carried out are not only through patron-client platforms, state corporations, and political and religious institutionalization but have led to ideological hegemony as a basis for regulating the principles of an organization or social group. The ideologization of this mass organization brings massive opposition among the people who seem to be controlled by the authorities for the sake of perpetuating power. When power carries the internal dynamics in a country, what happens is a strong desire to maintain power, even though by all means. In connection with the conception of power, many thinkers are very persistent in fighting for the theology of power so that it can be used as a political idea for a country (Takdir, 2009).

We can see this from the policy of the Normality Law Number 8 of 1985 which seeks to show that the government or the state systematically tries to ideologize mass organizations (Yaqin, 2009). Such rules then caused controversy that developed in society, because it seemed that there was an attempt to unify a mass organization or the acceptance of Pancasila as the only ideology that had to be implemented and was considered capable of accommodating all the aspirations of society as a whole.

Several situations in the life of religious communities under the New Order regime showed something massive and tended to be controlled by the authorities to minimize the role of religious institutions in examining policies that were considered contradictory. The portrait of religious life in Indonesia during the New Order era can illustrate to us that there is a politicization of policies against the role of religion which is considered dangerous to the hegemony of the rulers so that it needs to be controlled to suppress the openness of society so as not to cause massive resistance to the regime in power. The New Order government also controls the establishment of religious institutions, such as NU and Muhammadiyah as one of the religious organizations in Indonesia (Firmansyah, 2016).

In the late 1960s, the New Order regime emerged from a coalition of political and social forces which opposed President Soekarno (Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, 2010). When there was a transition of power from the Old Order to the New Order in 1996-1967, there was political unrest which was quite shocking and made this new era try to take several approaches in resolving all the riots that threatened domestic stability. The occurrence of a transfer of power can

often lead to instability in the state being on the verge of division and rioting, thus making the situation and conditions of a government ineffective. Especially when it comes to political unrest which is very vulnerable to rebellion and resistance against rulers who are unable to maintain the stability and security of society.

When the Old Order government applied parliamentary democracy and guided democracy, during the New Order era, it attempted to apply a new approach in the government system to suppress the escalation of riots that became increasingly out of control. Sometimes this new approach must be carried out in repressive and militaristic ways because it is considered capable of creating a strong government. In Adam Schwarz's view, the New Order held the belief that a strong and hegemonic state as much as possible isolated the strength of community groups that had dominant networks and also prevented antagonisms based on ethnoreligious sentiments (Schwarz, 1999).

The policy in the New Order era to exercise militaristic power was realized by the concern over the emergence of community groups that were considered dangerous in disrupting the stability of the government, such as a separatist group from different religions. For the New Order, acts of resistance that led to an escalation of violence in various regions could fail the government that was under construction, requiring repressive policies. Especially if the escalation of violence shows the arrogance of tribalism which can ignite people's enthusiasm to oppose the New Order government (Takdir, 2012). Militaristic policies are considered capable of limiting the political space of the people to be directly involved in-state activities that require representation.

During the New Order era, people's political space was always limited, because the state needed calm to build economic strength (material accomplishment of development). In achieving this ambition, the New Order reduced the role of socio-political-religious organizations, the freedom of the masses to organize, and religious demands that were centrifugal (from the bottom up), because they were considered to be a threat (treatment) to government authority and power. If there is a religious organization formed by other than the government, like NU and Muhammadiyah, then it needs to be closely monitored so as not to cause resistance to undermine the permanence of power.

Efforts to reduce the role of religious organizations are considered to be the most effective way to stabilize national politics so that there is no resistance among the community. Moreover, the tightening of the government on people's lives (regimentation) is considered capable of providing significant economic growth and strengthening confidence in a political regime. With this regimen, the government sees a relevance between political stability and economic growth which is an important reference for maintaining sentiments so as not to spread to the lower-class society. Political and economic policy became a major force in the new order period to maintain power (Pepinsky, 2016). In such conditions, all forms of socio-cultural diversity must be uniform to reduce social conflict and friction, because they are considered to be a stronger ingredient of national development.

We can see the form of reducing the role of religion during the New Order era from the formation of the Indonesian Ulema Council on July 26, 1956, the Indonesian Church Association established on May 25, 1950, the Indonesian Bishops' Conference on November 20, 1974, Indonesian Buddhist Representatives on August 20, 1998, and Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia on

February 23, 1959. The formation of these religious institutions can be considered as part of state intervention against internal religion in the hope of overseeing any deviant sects to assist the government in acting legally. This condition makes it easier for the government to monitor religious developments in Indonesia which are considered to have deviated from the mainstream (Epley, 2013).

This phenomenon was part of the politicization of religion which forced the New Order to try hard to overthrow any group that wanted to make religion the basis of ideology or at least to legitimize political power structures that reflected religious sentiment. The violent prevention efforts carried out by the New Order can be seen throughout 1990. One example that remains in our memory is the Tanjung Priok tragedy in 1984, the violence against a splinter group led by Imran in 1980, and religious resistance in Lampung and Aceh. Ideologically, the state is constantly trying to incorporate various religious organizations, figures, and aspirations in a controlled bureaucratic machine (Hikam, 1996).

When the attitudes and policies of the state are like that, what is the position of religion in facing such harsh realities? It must be admitted that religious organizations have been trapped by the authorities for two decades, and have even been under great pressure due to very radical militaristic policies. This condition prevents most religious organizations from engaging in politics so that the religious leadership is getting weaker in taking a critical attitude towards the state. This was exacerbated by a coercive and cooperative move by the New Order government in reducing the roles of political parties that based their ideology on a particular religion. It is not surprising that in the three decades the New Order had a general trend, namely "economic development, yes; political conflict, no" (Yaqin, 2009, pp. 132-133).

When analyzed in-depth, these problems are a direct impact on the basic policies of the New Order, namely problems of political stability and economic growth. In simple terms, all the series of problems in various regions that continue to escalate and conflict with separatism can be understood as follows. First, the state does not have the knowledge and peace in solving every problem through the process of knowledge, both those that occur within the elite and among the lower classes. On the contrary, all conflicts are built on a violent-repressive logic. Second, control over the state always underestimates the facts about structural inequality, especially between regions as a result of centralized development. Third, hegemonizing as a derivation of political harmony is the cause of the death of the local community's capacity, where they fail to live autonomously (Nugroho, 2001).

In addition to reducing the role of religious organizations, the New Order government also implemented a policy that was contrary to the 1945 Constitution and the philosophy of Pancasila as the basis of the state which accommodated all cultural and religious diversity. This policy is related to the enactment of Pancasila as the single principle that must be the basis for all socio-political-religious organizations. Perhaps this policy was the culmination of psychological trauma from the New Order regime, which tried hard to uniform everything that concerned the interests of the authorities.

Making Pancasila as the sole principle narrows the philosophical meaning of this nation's ideology in the context of cultural and religious diversity. Pancasila has the same platform as a state philosophy that does not conflict with religious teachings, even the Pancasila ideology is considered a compliment in

enhancing religious principles which are uprooted by certain interests that want to obscure our national ideology. If traced, the Pancasila unity principle was first conveyed in President Suharto's state speech before the DPR session on August 16, 1982, which was later included in the MPR Decree No. II/1983. Then what is the purpose of establishing Pancasila as a single principle? The New Order claimed that this provision was made to maintain, strengthen and solidify Pancasila in the lives of all people. This stipulation also makes all social life based on religious and ideological sentiments must be replaced by the Pancasila principle (Ismail, 1999).

The unification of Pancasila is a New Order political strategy to reduce the role and influence of religion which can bring political instability and create enmity between groups so that a policy is needed that can curb all groups of society to participate in perpetuating this authoritarian regime. Since it first came to power in 1966, the New Order began its political hegemony to build a military force that could take action against anyone who opposed it and did not want to follow its directions or policies. During the New Order, the freedom of society was fully controlled as a form of the authoritarian regime (Prawira Yudha Pratama, Budiman & Mia Sarmiasih, 2019). As a result, community groups do not have the power to fight against the power which is known to be very banal and cruel in oppressing, so that it fosters political arrogance that is deeply rooted in the joints of life. Moreover, it continues to reduce the role of religion which is considered very dangerous in perpetuating its power.

In maintaining political stability, the New Order government was very good at politicizing religion as the strongest dimension, even though religion was the most rational reason to protect Pancasila. A way to keep the New Order government fluttering and untouched by frictions that could weaken the power of a regime. The New Order was very wary of the role of religion because, during the two decades of the administration, the religious sentiment was an aspect that could disrupt political stability. This situation was taken advantage of by the New Order to undermine all religious organizations that carried certain ideologies and were not following the policies of the authorities.

The New Order did present a regime that was very adept at playing the issue as the main weapon in reducing all religious sentiment. Even the New Order looked at the issue of religion not only as a national issue but also directly related to the trend of fundamentalism (religious understanding) that had occurred in the Islamic world in 1970, especially the emergence of the Iranian Islamic revolutionary movement, which raised government concerns about the growing influence of religious movements in the country (Vatikiotis, 1993).

2.2. Contestation of Religious Conflicts During the New Order Period: The Portrait of Religious Disharmony in Indonesia.

Indonesia has experienced a severe social blight through a series of ethnoreligious conflicts around the country, specifically in the New Order era (Regus, 2020). In the historical aspect, various ethnoreligious conflicts that occurred in various regions have become a dark record for the journey of this nation. Since 1950, the events of communal and sectarian conflicts have never subsided and have always colored people's lives. Various types of conflicts have graced the Soekarno and Soeharto administrations as well as the post-New Order government in 1998. One of them is the ethnic conflict that occurred in

Kalimantan in the mid-1990, to be precise the ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan (Priyono, 2005).

During the New Order government, ethnic conflicts occurred repeatedly, such as the Sampit conflict, Central Kalimantan, which broke out up to 16 times. The same thing happened to disputes or conflicts with religious nuances in Java, such as the Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, and Pekalongan incidents, which were among the conflicts that caught people's attention the most. Religious conflicts have occurred in North Halmahera since 1960, although the escalation is not too large (Tomagola, 2003). Likewise, what happened in Poso, which gave birth to two tensions and clashes between religious communities, in 1992 and 1995.

The various series of conflicts during the New Order era seemed to dismiss the growing assumption that communal and sectarian conflicts only often happened during the reform era. During the New Order era, religious conflicts did not occur on a large scale and tended to be controlled by the security apparatus. In fact, at this time it was once a miniature or an example of achieving harmony between religious communities. Moreover, Indonesia with multi religions is considered successful in uniting all religious groups with government policies that tend to be coercive and authoritarian. This can be seen from the political harmony that was practiced during the New Order era, which was considered successful in reconciling religious communities in Indonesia with a repressive policy that was able to pressure all religious leaders to stop all forms of tension, friction, and conflict between religious communities. In the context of Indonesia, religious conflict has been spurred by the conjunction of economic and social marginalization with significant demographic change (Searle, 2002).

The fall of the New Order regime did not mean that religious conflicts just subsided. Conflicts and violence in the name of religion often occur in line with increasingly strong demands for reform, especially during the post-19 May 1998 transition process, which resulted in many disputes among the lower class. The more massive religious conflicts during the New Order era cannot be separated from structural injustice, rampant discriminatory attitudes towards certain communal groups, and repressive actions by the security apparatus using military operations to suppress groups that are not in line with the New Order government (Varsheney, 2010).

Around 1996, Indonesia experienced a very tragic event, namely the occurrence of riots and conflicts with political, ethnic, and religious nuances. The conflict that occurred was the anti-Christian and anti-Chinese rioting on 10 October 1996, in Situbondo. If examined deeply, the anti-Christian and anti-Chinese conflicts in Situbondo can be said to be part of the fabrication of the New Order government. This incident cannot be separated from the previous incident, namely the raid on the PDI DPP office. Each of these loci of events reflected more of the two ideological forces in Indonesia which the New Order saw as elements that could prop up the status quo. In fact, in a secret document circulating among Suharto's elites, he mentions the existence of a "red and green" alliance between Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid which is considered a major threat to the maintenance of power.

The emergence of secret documents that were spread to the public, is considered to still hold a mystery that the Soeharto government had manipulated riots to defend its power from threats from its political opponents. From this document, the state is deliberately looking for opportunities to take advantage of

the situation within the framework of conflict management which is carried out by raising religious issues as the most convincing sentiment for the people to believe in the current state of the nation.

In the context of the riots that occurred in Situbondo, state violence tried to sublimate in the form of violence that seemed to be pure mass riots. Based on its intelligence power, the New Order as much as possible looked for opportunities related to potential conflicts which were considered to threaten the legitimacy of power so that the slightest conflict could turn into a big riot and draw wide attention from the community. The proof is that the Situbondo case, which originated from a Muslim's understanding of Islamic doctrine, was intervened by the interests of power, then changed as if it were a riot between religions.

The Situbondo case is a reflection of state power which is institutionalized and carried out by the state apparatus which is repressive, exploitative, militaristic, and ideological. In this context, the state plays an important role in igniting the flames of violence in society so that the authorities have rational reasons for stigmatizing certain groups. Therefore, the violence that occurred in Situbondo not only provided an ironic portrait of a riot between one religious group and another but also a systemic attempt to create a degradation of the reputation of a certain religious group. The state is a hegemony layered with coercive power, which freely uses means of coercion and means of establishing hegemonic leadership (Arief, 1999).

Jacques Bertrand saw that the scale of riots, demonstrations, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts grew out of the reconstruction of the regions by political power. The institutionalized political power has made Indonesia a field of riots and conflicts filled with violent narratives that have resulted in the erosion of the fundamental structure of a country. This study tries to look at the deep cracks and erosion of the social fabric. The number of conflicts and their intensity is not accidental. Every event has a different nature of conflict, scale, and causes. However, the eruption of conflict in that period cannot be released without referring to the general underlying factors. At this point, Bertrand saw that the factors that led to the rise of religious and ethnic conflicts were the institutional changes that accompanied the end of the New Order regime (Betrand, 2012).

Observing religious conflicts that have led to violence in Indonesia, it seems that the government often takes strategic positions to take advantage of the situation. The government can be accused of committing crimes by allowing violence based on religion (crime by omission). This situation is of course a concern for this nation's journey because the resolution of conflicts in this country is never complete. Indonesia is known as a harmonious country in maintaining unity between communities, but currently faces the potential for greater conflict. This is consistent with the view of Robert W. Hefner that the emergence of religious conflicts is caused by the politicization of religion by the government (Hefner, 2010).

By looking at developments in the regions, the potential for conflict between religious communities is enormous. Potential conflicts are very difficult to avoid because there are groupings based on religious teachings. This clustering in the name of religion can lead to misunderstandings among adherents of religious teachings, which makes them prone to conflict. Conflict is a situation and condition of conflict between two groups (individuals) or more that are not harmonious because of unsatisfied interests. According to Wallenstein, conflict

involves three elements, namely partisans, interests, and resistance (Wallenstein, 1999).

Several bloody communal conflicts have indeed rocked several areas in Indonesia from late 1990 to early 2000, including violent conflicts that occurred in the provinces of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan which could be said to be inter-ethnic riots. which is classified as massive. Community groups acting on behalf of themselves as the original ethnic groups of Kalimantan-Dayak and Malay ethnicities face off against groups of people who are considered migrants from the island of Madura. Dayak people and other ethnic communities have received back the people of Madura. Two or three years after, in that event, the Madurese have been able to return to get together with society and work to their living needs (Haryanto, 2013).

From this communal conflict the question arises, why did research into ethnic politics during the New Order era and the transition to democracy become interesting, especially the ethnoreligious conflict that occurred in Kalimantan? First, the incomplete handling of communal conflicts in Kalimantan. Specifically, in East Kalimantan, communal conflicts are very vulnerable and have the potential to develop, because the diversity of the people shows the dominance of Javanese 36%, Bugis 22%, Banjar 17%, while Dayak and Kutai ethnic groups only 12% respectively. Taking into account the composition in East Kalimantan, where ethnic immigrants are the majority and control the central trade and government, so that communal conflicts can surface. While communal conflicts occurred between Dayak and Madurese ethnicities in West Kalimantan in 1997 and Central Kalimantan in 2001, they are not completely resolved so they can occur at any time. Uniquely, this ethnic conflict did not extend to East Kalimantan, because there were fewer Madurese there than 1%: 12% of the Dayak people (Gunawan, 2004).

It seems that a small communal conflict occurred in East Kalimantan, but at a very high level of conflict of interest, especially in controlling structural positions and resources. There are many reasons for this conflict. First, the rise of ethnic politics is very dependent on the control of indigenous ethnicities over the forest, if the forest is controlled by ethnic immigrants, then latent conflicts will arise. Second, the rise of ethnic politics is related to the success of the democratization process in Indonesia. So, the problem that stands out in East Kalimantan is the gap between the government and the indigenous people. There are three very prominent indications regarding the triggers of communal conflict in East Kalimantan, namely indigenous peoples and customary land, so conflicts occur (Gunawan, 2004, p. 335).

Second, it shows that companies granted forest concession rights by the government are dominated by ethnic Chinese and Suharto's cronies. By paying attention to the 10% of HPH-holding companies in East Kalimantan, the potential for conflict between native ethnicities as land and forest owners and ethnic immigrants will easily materialize. The forests in East Kalimantan turned out to be plots of land by Suharto so that they could trigger post-Suharto communal conflicts to reduce conflicts between native ethnics and immigrants, the New Order regime placed soldiers to carry out repressive and militaristic actions. As we know the Madurese and Dayak people, have a long history of conflict rooted in resource exploitation and inward migration. The Dayak are indigenous people

living in a forest area, more than half of which has been exploited by the government Suharto (Nakaya, 2018).

Third, the democratic transition from the New Order regime to democratic governance has resulted in communal violence and conflict between political elites. Tadjoeddin examines violent conflict during the transition and divides the four categories, which include communal conflict. First, conflicts between ethnicities, religions, and violence caused by migration, the May 1998 riots before Suharto stepped down, looting, acts of violence between supporters of political parties, acts of violence due to seizure of resources, violence against witch doctors in Banyuwangi, violence between communities. Second, the separatist movements in Aceh and Papua have resulted in armed conflicts. Third, violence between countries and communities. Fourth, industrial violence against companies (Ihsan Ali Fauzi, 2009).

So, the development of conflicts that occurred during the New Order era and the era of democratic transition (1993-2001) was very large. In the period from 1990 to 1998, there were 434 cases reported and then it increased significantly to 1926 cases, which occurred in the period 1998-2001 (during the Habibi-Gus Dur administration). The tendency of acts of violence has increased in the transitional era (Habibi-Gus Dur, Megawati) with the report of 1492 cases on May 21, 1998-December 2001. Thus, all forms of violence have increased significantly after the fall of the Soeharto regime, with the emergence of religious issues that began occurred since the Surabaya incident (9 June 1996), the Situbondo conflict (10 October 1996), the Tasikmalaya conflict (26 December 1996), the Rengasdengklok conflict (30 June 1997), and then expanded to Central Java.

In its development, the religious ruling conflict was used as an opportunity by the New Order government to divide the supporters of Gus Dur and Megawati, who openly opposed Suharto's candidacy for president in 1997. During the New Order era, 456 places of worship were destroyed, giving the impression of a conflict between Islam-Christian which had an impact on the decline in Wahid and Mega's prestige. The communal violence that stood out during the New Order was a conflict between religions that was deliberately engineered. Religious and ethnic sentiments seem to have been directed by the New Order to pit the people against each other to create dependence on the Suharto regime.

Fourth, in general in some areas prone to latent conflict and without conflict management wisely were very vulnerable to violence. Conflicts between indigenous ethnic groups (Dayak and Kutai) and immigrants (Javanese, Bugis, Chinese, Madurese), which occurred in East Kalimantan were never resolved. Likewise, the Dayak and Madurese ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan which sacrificed 500 people has the potential to come back to the surface (Nooteboom, 2006). The communal conflict in 1997 in West Kalimantan claimed 1,500-2000 victims, potentially arising because it was not yet resolved (Tanasaldy, 2009).

Fifth, there is a paradigm shift from the engineered New Order General Elections to democratic elections, in which the people directly elect members of the legislature and the executive, so that there is a potential for latent conflict in the realm of the elite and ethnic group communities. It shows the relationship between ethnic groups and political actors, often political actors use ethnic issues for the benefit of political parties. Thus, the problem of conflict in East Kalimantan was never resolved by indigenous people but was always carried out in a top-down, militaristic manner. The repressive resolution of these communal

conflicts is part of the New Order strategy to feel the community (Ardans, 1992). In essence, there is a relationship between the communal conflict in East Kalimantan and the collapse of the New Order, which is related to what is the motive behind the communal conflict motive. During the New Order, ethnic groups were repressed and marginalized, while the transitional era of society rose to mobilize the masses to seize power.

2.3. The Mechanism of Resolving Religious Conflict During the New Order Period.

It must be admitted that the potential for conflict during the New Order was deeply hidden, which was due to the government's tight control so that it did not provide space for people in conflict areas to discuss various identity problems in a healthy public space. Differences in religion and ethnicity raise new problems when it comes to the position and distribution of power. The New Order government did not provide room for negotiations but closed the meeting through the state apparatus. Likewise, the pattern of local leadership recruitment is also strictly regulated by the central government.

The diversity of factors that triggered conflict in the New Order era shows the complexity of the problems faced by communities in many conflict-prone areas, in areas where the composition of the population and ethnicity has experienced ups and downs and balanced population composition, then the potential for conflict with religious and ethnic backgrounds is vulnerable to conflict. However, in several areas with abundant resource potential, such as Aceh, Papua, East Kalimantan, and Riau, the potential for conflict with separatist nuances is very prominent. Some have even used armed resistance such as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Free Papua Organization (OPM). Which put a lot of pressure on the Central government, and drained the energy of power by causing many victims on both sides.

The resolution of separatist conflicts always uses Military Operations in Aceh. Even it is made into Military Operations Areas which took thousands of victims during the operation period. Likewise in Papua, the pattern of military operations was put forward, so that the chances of resolving conflicts based on deliberation or dialogue hardly went well. It was only in the reform era that the separatist conflict was resolved, through the Helsinki agreement in Aceh and the enactment of the Special Autonomy Law and Papua. Likewise, the resolution of identity conflicts during the New Order era in the early 1990s, such as the rioting and burning of churches in Situbondo. The Tasikmalaya riots, the riots in Banjarmasin, and the Rengasdengklok, until the 27 July 1996 riots were resolved through repressive and militarist law enforcement. The perpetrators of the conflict were never tried transparently, some were even covered up, thus creating a mystery who was the real perpetrator of the identity riots in the New Order era (Varsheny, 2002).

In some conflicts that have occurred, the model for conflict resolution that has been practiced is to use law enforcement repressively. The government as the policyholder often does a mediation model to resolve conflicts between conflicting groups, but what is most visible is strict law enforcement. The strict law enforcement model is part of the method of conflict resolution, but it tends to be incomplete and still creates embers in the husk, which one day has the potential for further conflicts.

One model of conflict resolution that was applied during the New Order era was a combination of government and civil society. One of the government's efforts to resolve the Ambon and Poso conflicts was to initiate the Malino 1 and Malino 2 meetings. At the same time, civil society attempted to resolve conflicts using the Baku Bae movement. The emergence of this movement came from the idea of Ichsan Malik from the Peace Titian Institute together with Muslim and Christian activists in Ambon and Poso. This conflict resolution model shows two combinations that mutually support and play a role in efforts to resolve conflicts in Indonesia. There are many religious actors, social agencies, and local prayers in the building of peace and true reconciliation (Al-Qurtuby, 2012).

During the New Order era, the role of civil society in resolving conflicts did not occupy a strategic position, in fact, it always came under pressure from the government. Conflict resolution mechanisms with a local cultural approach do not get the same space and opportunities so that local beliefs appear to weaken in resolving various conflicts that occur in the community by themselves. This condition certainly has major implications for the freedom and independence of the community in resolving conflicts, because the government has often systematically weakened its culture.

In this condition, conflict resolution models and mechanisms using a power approach must begin to be abandoned. The involvement of the role of the state which is very dominant and repressive, makes the people fight aggressively. Thus, the government needs to prioritize community strength by encouraging all conflict resolution based on local mechanisms or approaches, either through customary mechanisms or deliberations at the local or village level. At the same time, community involvement that is too dominant can lead to attitudes of violence, anarchy, loss of government authority, and apathy that arise in society. To anticipate violence and conflict in society, balance and justice are needed in placing the roles of each, both government and society at the grassroots level.

Seeing such conflict resolution mechanisms, the government should have made a paradigm shift in the matter of conflict resolution in a developing communal issue in Indonesia. For example, the existence of peace initiatives carried out by peacemakers using local mechanisms as the most representative approach for the interests of the wider community. However, local mechanisms often get less response from the government, which prefers a security approach as a last resort in resolving conflicts in society, both communal and sectarian conflicts. The conflict resolution model of the West Sumatra model has great power, which can be emulated by other countries that have major problems in the form of public distrust of formal justice institutions.

In the history of conflict resolution in Indonesia, at least it has always been done with two approaches. First, the formal and procedural settlement model is played by the government and its legal apparatus. Second, a cultural settlement model that is fully played by local communities using customary mechanisms that have been in effect from generation to generation. In a conflict resolution, sometimes the two mechanisms work to strengthen each other, or sometimes work separately, sometimes even weaken each other. Therefore, every effort to create regulations in conflict resolution must not weaken one or both of them.

3. CONCLUSION

During the New Order era, where power was very central and the role of the state was hegemonic, the conflict resolution mechanism emphasized more

repressive and militarist actions. This kind of model does give hope of achieving better nation-building, but behind it, all governments also use a violent approach as a form of anticipation in counteracting community resistance which is considered to hinder state policy. In the end, the conflict resolution mechanism changed the pattern or approach from the Bar Order to the Reform Order. This change is related to the situation and condition of the government which is experiencing upheaval and opposition from that society.

During the New Order era, the role of the state was very dominant and the role of civil society was very weak in fighting against the authorities. Meanwhile, during the Reformation Era, the role of the state began to erode and became weaker along with the strengthening of the role of civil society in combating aggressively against the government. Thus, it is impossible to carry out a uniform pattern of settlement given the very multicultural situation of the Indonesian nationality. This is because each region has local wisdom in resolving its respective conflicts. In essence, the model of settlement of dialogue can still work well, by involving formal officials such as village heads and community leaders who are considered elders. Using an agreement between community leaders, the conflicts that occur can be resolved properly and do not cause further turmoil in the future.

During the reform era, the role of the state in resolving conflicts was very weak. The proof is that there are a lot of conflicts and claims against the government which is considered to be less assertive in resolving every conflict in society. At that time, the government was walking aimlessly because of the distrust of the people. Meanwhile, civil society began to carry out resistance movements by establishing and strengthening the existence of customary institutions in various regions. Likewise with the emergence of many NGOs and mass organizations which increasingly emphasize the weakness of the government in overcoming conflicts. So, the existence of civil society organizations is considered a new movement to strengthen the spirit of unity and unity among fellow nations. This condition is sufficient to provide hope for the upholding of the pillars of democracy, but it cannot be used as a benchmark, given the tidal conditions of civil society in Indonesia. In other words, the government and the community must work together in resolving any conflicts in the regions so that they have an equal role and position in creating harmony between fellow children of the nation.

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