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COMMEMORATING AND FORGETTING: POLITICAL MEMORY OF THE BATTLE OF SURABAYA THROUGHOUT OLD ORDER AND NEW ORDER REGIMES IN INDONESIA (1951 - 1988)

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ABSTRACT

The gallantry of the people of Surabaya in resisting Allied forces in 10th November 1945 led the government to designate that date as Heroes' Day. Various ceremonies are held and monuments are built to preserving the memory of the battle. However, the construction of this historical memory is not without its own interests. This research examines how historical memory of the Battle of Surabaya was constructed throughout the administration of Sukarno and Suharto, why the memory was erected and what aspect was deliberately forgotten. Employing historical methodology, this research shows Sukarno leveraged these historical narratives to foster nationalism and enhance Indonesia's international standing. Under the regime of Suharto, the construction of historical memory was similarly used to promote his political agendas, spread anti-communism and legitimate military role. Both regimes sought to conceal the killings of civilians and the disparities between central administration and local Surabaya residents due to beliefs that it would undermine nationalism and heroic narrative.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1970, national newspaper *Kompas* announced that to commemorate the Battle of Surabaya, which has been officially designated as Heroes' Day, a big ceremony will be held in Surabaya in 10th of November. President Suharto, who oftenly attended the commemoration in Jakarta, has decided to put Surabaya as the central celebration point, the site of the battle (Anonim, 1970). Statues to symbolize the fights of independence preservation was officially inaugurated. At the end of New Order, Heroes' Day is celebrated annually using various methods such as the stories

of fight, walking accompanied by posters, the Battle of Surabaya theatrical and et cetera. (Anonim, 1984, hlm. 4).

Seeing from the side of historical chronology, the Battle of Surabaya is a non-repeatable occurred event. However, looking at it from liturgical perspective, the event that took place in the past is attempted to be resurrected (Spiegel, 2002). Ceremonies, construction of a monument and statues are one way to revive and preserve the memory of the battle.

Under the rule of Sukarno and Suharto, the individual memories of the revolutionaries shared to the community who did not experience the revolution firsthand. This makes the community, who did not directly experience in the revolutionary struggle, able to feel the same memory of that struggle. The community no longer viewed the struggle to maintain independence solely as the memory of the revolutionaries, but also their own collective memory (Assmann, 2008, hlm. 52).

The process of forming collective memory is not completely detached from its own interests. In forming the memories, there is a selection process, where certain elements are shown and others are forgotten. The content of the memory is closely tied to the individuals or groups creating that memory. In this research, the history of forming collective memory of the Battle of Surabaya will be studied, investigating the purpose of its creation and the elements that have been forgotten.

This research focuses on the forming memory of the Battle of Surabaya. Commemoration of Heroes' Day and construction of monument regarding the Battle of Surabaya held outside of Surabaya will not be discussed in this research. Choosing the administration of Sukarno and Suharto as the forming of collective memory during these periods were carried out extensively and continuously for specific purposes. Both administrations also centralized the discourse on the memory of the battle.

Specific studies mentioning the political memory of the Battle of Surabaya during the administration of Sukarno and Suharto have not been accessible. Sarkawi B. Husain in his book, *Negara di Tengah Kota: Politik Representasi dan Simbolisme Perkotaan Surabaya:1930-1960* indeed explained briefly about the construction of Heros Monument in Surabaya, although he did not focus on studying the political memory of the Battle of Surabaya in different areas, Heroes Day commemoration and other instruments to preserve the memory of the battle. Sarkawi's writing is limited to 1960, hence the political memory during the administration of Suharto was not referred at all.

Paul Bijl's article, '*Colonial Memory and Forgetting in the Netherlands and Indonesia*,' also touches the political memory of revolution. While Bijl compares the revolutionary memories present in the Netherlands and Indonesia, his writing did not specifically delve into the Battle of Surabaya. Instead, his study offers a general perspective of revolutionary memories.

Most studies specifically mentioning the Battle of Surabaya do not delve into political memory. For instance, the government published a book '*Pertempuran Surabaya*' (The Battle of

Surabaya) in 1982 providing a comprehensive account of the event but strongly emphasizes on military roles and the aspect of political memory is completely neglected. Additionally, this book is heavily focused on the narrative of Indonesian struggle. Robert Cribb's article *'The Brief Genocide of Eurasians in Indonesia 1945/1946'* and William H. Frederick's *'The Killing of Dutch and Eurasians in Indonesia's National Revolution (1945-49): a Brief Genocide Reconsidered'*, outlined that the Battle of Surabaya is not only a fight to resist Allied forces but there are also aspects to be revealed, for example the violence against Eurasians perpetrated by Indonesian fighters. The reason of the violence is also not preserved and highlighted. Other article from Abdul Wahid, published on The Jakarta Post, *'The Untold Story of the Surabaya Battle of 1945'* mentioned Frederick's discovery is significantly different the conventional history through text book and curriculum. Wahid, like other authors, did not elaborate on the process of how the memory of the Battle of Surabaya was formed.

Given the limitations of literature specifically examining about the political memory surrounding the Battle of Surabaya during the Sukarno and Suharto period, this article seeks to fill this gap. Such a study is important to understand the background memory about Surabaya heroes has been carefully taken care of, while darker or more controversial memory of the battle is forgotten. This article will discuss the event of the Battle of Surabaya first, followed by the discussion regarding the construction of its memory and the elements deliberately omitted from the narrative.

II. METHODS

The method used in this research is historical method which consisted of four steps: heuristic, verification, interpretation and historiography. Heuristic is the process of collecting data from relevant sources. Collected sources are not limited to secondary source such as books and scientific articles, but also includes primary source. Primary sources include news report like *Kompas*, *Berita Yudha*, *Bisnis Indonesia* and description found in monuments or statues of the Battle of Surabaya.

After all the sources are compiled, verification process will be undertaken through external and internal criticism. External criticism aims to authenticate the data, while internal criticism checks the credibility of information. The next step is interpretation where the verified data will be interpreted in historical context and its relevance theme. The last step is historiography, the arrangement of interpretation result to become systematical.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Battle of Surabaya and Its Meaning

The Battle of Surabaya is the battle between alliance and Bumiputera in the beginning of independence. This battle was provoked by the arrival of Allied forces (England) that continuously

descended their forces in Surabaya. The landing of the forces created doubts to Indonesian fighters. They suspect that alliances want to conquer Indonesia even though the declaration of independence is already held on 17th August 1945.

Suspects met its own justification when the young of Surabayan leader, Moestopo, Dul Arwono, Abdul Wahab, Governor Suryo and others found that the newly arrival Allied forces are Netherlands. (Besuki, 1978, hlm. 4). This is in line with the task given to Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia to maintain security order until the Dutch may rule again. At the end of September, Rear Admiral Patterson as the Fifth Carrier Squadron Commander announced the purpose openly. According to Patterson, the law of the Dutch will reorder in Java and the Dutch government will only yield to Commander Mountbatten. This announcement will soon followed by the landing of Dutch forces which openly supported by England. (George McTurnan Kahin, 2013, hlm. 205 & 206).

The purpose of Allied forces to rule Indonesia opposed to the aspirations of the citizens that want Indonesia to be an independent and sovereign country. This led to the inevitable conflict between Indonesia and Allied forces. The conflict briefly stopped when Sukarno negotiated a truce with Mallaby and Hawthorn. However, the conflict resurfaced after General Mallaby was found murdered. On 7th November 1945, Mansergh, Fifth Division Commander, issued ultimatum to the Indonesian leader to march on Surabaya's main road at 6.00 PM with their hands raised. Those who bring weapon might also need to submit to the Allied Forces (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1986, hlm. 58). If the ultimatum was ignored, the allies threatened to launch a massive attack to Surabaya at 6.00 am in the morning. Undeterred, Indonesian fighters refused to acquiesce and comply. On 9th November, Sutomo even summoned the youth of Surabaya not to fear confronting the Allied forces. Ultimately, the Battle of Surabaya broke on 10th November (Hermawan Sulistyono, 1989, hlm. 4).

During their attack, the Allied forces were surprised to find themselves battling not only the military but also the young people with no military experience. They armed themselves with sharpened bamboo spears, *keris* (Indonesian traditional weapon), machetes, captured weapons and anything that could be used as a weapon (Antony Reid, 2018, hlm. 36; Gerry van Klinken & Maarten van Der Bent, 2023, hlm. 130). They were joined in resistance organizations such as *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (People's Security Corps), paramilitary groups, and others (Sartono Kartodirdjo, 1981, hlm. 5). Supports toward the struggle against the Allied forces came in various forms, not just joining the battle. Women, for instance, provided provisions for the fighters, while others served as medical personnel. Even Shamans and sorcerers contributed to maintain independence by casting spells to prevent the British troops' rice from being edible (Onghokham, 1985, hlm. 7).

The Battle of Surabaya ended on 20th November 1945. The Allied forces successfully repelling the revolutionary fighters. Although Indonesia was failed to win this battle, the Battle of Surabaya

contains a great significance. First, the overwhelming support from Indonesians made the British realized that Indonesian independence was backed by a lot of people, not merely elites as what they assumed before. This led the British to act neutral urged the Dutch to negotiate with Indonesia. Thus, the Battle of Surabaya paved a diplomatic way in the following years, prominently in 1946 and 1947 (George McTurnan Kahin, 2013, hlm. 209; Ricklefs, 2008, hlm. 254). Secondly, the Battle of Surabaya became the catalyst of maintaining independence. The bravery of the youth Surabayans inspired resistance against the Allies in other regions. The significance of the Battle of Surabaya led the government to designate 10th November as Heroes' Day, which according to Anthony Reid is the second most important commemoration after Independence Day (Anthony Reid, 2018, hlm. 37).

Memory Construction of The Battle of Surabaya

After successfully maintaining independence and acclaimed international recognition, the government promptly constructed monuments, statues and buildings as symbols. The purpose of these constructions was to ensure that the collective memory of the struggle is well preserved through generations. When the memories of previous generations had faded, the monuments continue to exist and become the reminder for the next generations, reminding the immense sacrifices made by the fighters in defending Indonesian independence (Abidin Kusno, 2009, hlm. 14). Therefore, the battles that have taken place have not only been used to build national identity and nationalism for the present but also for the future (Putra, 2001, hlm. 472).


Sukarno intended that the heroic spirit and nationalism remembered through the construction of symbols in public spaces. In 1951, on top of the debris of the Raad van Justitie (or Kempetai Building) which was destroyed during the Battle of Surabaya, Doel Arwono, the first Mayor of Surabaya, initiated to construct Heroes Monument, with himself as the chairman (Sarkawi B. Husain, 2010, hlm. 65).

In 1951, Sukarno laid the first foundationstone and planted a charter for the construction of Heroes Monument. Sukarno requested the design of the monument to be delivered to him. After looking through the design, he disagreed some of the aspects of the construction. Later on, Sukarno gave an example of the the monument by piercing a nail upside down (Sarkawi B. Husain, 2010, hlm. 66). Additionally, Sukarno also rejected the plan to build a statue around the Heroes' Monument. He did not want the monument to be identified with a particular figure because it feels as if it only belongs to one generation. Sukarno wanted the Heroes' Monument to belong to all generation so the struggle and nationalism kept to be inherited.

“This is how a monument should be. There is no need for statues because those figures are temporary, on the other hand, this monument must depict eternity ” (Museum of Sepuluh Nopember, t.t.).

Construction of the monument began in February 1952 and was inaugurated on November 10, 1952. The height of the Heroes' Monument is 45 yards (41,13 metres) unlike the previous plan.

The number 45 symbolizes the battle that took place in 1945. The monument's design remained faithful to the original. The body contains ten indentations, symbolized the date of the battle. Inside, there is an entrance leading to eleven steps staircase, representing the month of the battle (Anonim, 1981, hlm. 1; Yusuf Abdullah Puar, 1981, hlm. 4). At the base of the monument (relief wall), there are a trisula formed ornaments, stambha, cangka, chakra and Padma sula. The significant of all these ornaments is the flaming courage in defending independence by using various weapons, which in Wayang (Javanese shadow puppetry) are symbolized by the Cakra Pusaka Kresna and Trisula Pusaka Arjuna (Sarkawi B. Husain, 2010, hlm. 67).



Picture 1. Construction of Heroes' Monument
Source : Museum of Sepuluh Nopember

At the inauguration of Heroes' Monument on 10th November 1952, Sukarno emphasized that the monument is pivotal making it a symbol that Indonesian people has immense spirit. Thus, in addition to shaping a national identity among the Indonesian people themselves, construction of Heroes' monument was also aimed to form an identity and elevate Indonesia's status on the global state (Sarkawi B. Husain, 2010, hlm. 68).

“The event of 10th November proves to the entire world that Indonesian nation does not have small spirit as what they have known. A great spirit, accompanied by unwavered determination, was demonstrated by our heroes.”

After successfully constructing Heroes' Monument, efforts to commemorate the Battle of Surabaya did not cease. In 1957, Sukarno issued a decree regarding national independence heroes. Through the decree, Sukarno also instructed that every 10th of November will be commemorated as a day to reminisce the souls of the national heroes, a commemoration that had already been carried previously (Aditya Nugroho Widiadi, 2019, hlm. 75). Heroes' day itself is enacted by Sukarno in 1959, which stipulated in Keppres No. 316 1959 (Presidential regulations) regarding National days (Alexander Haryanto, 2021). Therefore, it is not only the Heroes' Monument that serves as a

memorial to the Battle of Surabaya but there are also rituals and ceremonies conducted by the government every 10th November.

Unlike the Heroes' Monument, the celebration of the Heroes' Day are through certain ceremonies and commemorations contain a more dynamic and flexible significance. The significance of Heroes' Day is largely determined by the discourse of power when the commemoration is held. In 1961, on the day of Heroes' Day, Sukarno mentioned that a great nation is a nation that honors the services of its heroes (Irfani, 2016, hlm. 135). Sukarno was a master at manipulating symbols. Encouragement to honor the services of heroes of the Battle of Surabaya is also an indirect call to reminisce and honor his role as a president and the actor that successfully urged a ceasefire (Aditya Nugroho Widiadi, 2019, hlm. 75).

After Suharto stepped into power, things related to Sukarno's big role is omitted. The erasure of Sukarno's role was not only evident on the commemoration of the Battle of Surabaya, but also in other aspects such as historiography and curriculum taught at school. For instance, the curriculum issued by the New Order in 1968 was highly anti-Sukarno and leaned towards Suharto's role in saving Indonesia from hyperinflation and the communists threat (Zulkarnain, 2019, hlm. 369). Sukarno is no longer had a significant place in the official history narratives.

Suharto also took new steps to distinguish his leadership era from the previous period. He referred his period of leadership as "New Order". He viewed "Old Order" during the period of Sukarno's leadership as an era full of problems, such as hyperinflation and riots, hence the "development strategy" proposed by Widjojo Nitisastro was seen appropriate solution to address these various issues (Anderson, 1983, hlm. 488).

Suharto embodied the development strategy in various fields, including in interpreting the Battle of Surabaya. In 1970, the commemoration of Heroes' Day was held in Surabaya. Suharto chose the theme, "Strengthening national resilience by consolidating development and Pancasila democracy." From the theme, it can be inferred that Suharto did not just commemorate the day to build national consciousness but also contextualized it with the interests of the time, the interests of development (Anonim, 1970, hlm. 1).

In the same year 1970, Suharto did not only attend Heroes' Day ceremonial but also inaugurated the General Sudirman Monument on Jalan Yos Soedarso on 10th November. The statue depicts General Sudirman standing tall with a command staff in his hand. At the base of the statue, there is a marble plaque containing an inscription stating that the statue was inaugurated by Suharto, also a quote from General Sudirman that is expected to inspire the fighting spirit of the next generation. On the following day, five other statues were also inaugurated in various points in Surabaya. These statues are scattered across Jembatan Merah (Red Bridge), Alun-Alun Contong (Contong Town Square), in front of Majapahit Hotel and Jalan Kombes M. Duriyat. These inauguration ceremonies were attended by a number of revolutionary fighters that directly involved in the battles, such as Bung Tomo, Soengkonono and others (Anonim, 1970, hlm. 1, 2022).



Picture 2. The statue in front of Siola, one of the statues inaugurated in 1970

Source: Detik.com

The government realized that statues could serve as guardians to collective memory of the battle that had taken place in Surabaya, however the stories of the battle itself could not be passed merely through statues. Suharto appointed the Head of Military Forces History Center, Brigjen Nugroho Notosusanto to put the Battle of Surabaya into writing. His writing was first published in 1970, with its English version entitled *'The Battle fo Surabaya'*. However, the book was not comprehensive, with only 15 pages long (Nugroho Notosusanto, 1970). In 1974, Nugroho Notosusanto put more effort into writing the battle of Surabaya. Nugroho gathered the involved fighters to attend a meeting in Grahadi room at Jalan pemuda. The attended figures were General Mayor Jonosewojo, Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani, General Mayor Sungkono, Dul Arwono, General Mayor Yasin, Mayor Rakimin, TK. Kundan and others. Total fighters that have attended the meeting were 100. Nugroho asked them to deliver their testimony during the battle (Anonim, 1974, hlm. 2).

After successfully gathering information from revolutionary fighters who were mostly military personnel, the book *Pertempuran Surabaya* was published 1982. This book aimed to inspire the next generation, so its content is very thick on heroism. Military role in the battle of Surabaya was also highlighted, for example curriculum taught at school. (Aditya Nugroho Widiadi, 2019, hlm. 75). Nevertheless, the book also highlighted role of women in providing logistic to the revolutionary fighters. Sukarno's role in brokering a ceasefire is also mentioned (Nugroho Notosusanto, 1985, hlm. 60 & 132). It is different from the Heroes' Day ceremony where Sukarno is rarely mentioned.

Aside from constructing collective memory through books, it was also represented through monuments and statues. In 1979, the statue of Governor Suryo was inaugurated. This statue was built and inaugurated by the Governor of East Java, located in front of Apsari Park, bears a prominent inscription of Governor Suryo's rejecting the ultimatum from British. The sentence, "*it is better to be destroyed than to be colonized,*" is clearly displayed under the legs of Governor Suryo (Anonim, 2023c). Although this development was not initiated directly by Suharto, it was not entirely free from his own interests. The centralized system of government at that time obliged regional policies, including the construction of statues, to obtain permission from central

government. Moreover, the central government had significant authority in determining the governor of East Java (Mohammad Agus, 2012, hlm. 83).

For Suharto, the construction of statues and things related to Governor Suryo was not only to reminisce the Battle of Surabaya, but also to remind public of the atrocities committed by communists (PKI). In 1987, Suharto inaugurated a bridge in Surabaya and named it Jembatan Suryo (Suryo Bridge). During the inauguration, Suharto openly stated:

“He (Suryo) was the fighter that fought in seizing and upholding the independence of Indonesia. Hero R.T Soerjo was not fallen to the bullets of the colonizers but to the communist atrocities in Madiun 1948.” (Anonim, 1987, hlm. 3)

Suharto created a message that, the first governor of East Java who fought relentlessly defending the independence of nation is no longer unable to devote himself to the country because of the communists. Sukarno himself had already erected a monument specifically referred to remember the cruelty of communists toward Governor Suryo in Ngawi 1957 (Roewadji, 1995, hlm. 6).

During the 80s, the accomplices of New Order, especially provincial government and military continuously inaugurated various monuments to preserve the memory regarding the Battle of Surabaya stays alive. Most of the monuments, statues and plaques that had been inaugurated focused on the military and civilian roles in defending independence. In 1980, the Head Staff of Army, Poniman, inaugurated Wira Surya Agung Monument. This monument was built at Jalan Darmo Wonokromo, the location between Allied forces and Indonesian fighters. The monument displays four statues in prone, crouching, upright and standing positions, representing the stages of the struggle of defending independence. The names of the battle victims are also inscribed on the monument as a tribute to the fallen heroes (Anonim, 2023a). The following year, Governor of East Java inaugurated Monumen Bambu Runcing (Bamboo Spear Monument), as a symbol of bravery from the revolutionary fighters who fought with nothing more than just a bamboo spear (Lambertus Hurek, 2021).

A large number of plaque and monument construction was occurred in 1988. On 2nd October 1988, the Commander of the Armed Forces inaugurated Monument Perjuangan Polri (Monument of Police Struggle). Based on the name, this monument was erected to commemorate the police services in defending independence. In this monument, there is a proclamation by M. Jasin which reads, “to unite with the people in the struggle to defend proclamation of 17th August 1945 by declaring the police as the Police of the Republic of Indonesia” (Anonim, 2023b; Hurek, 2022). Coinciding with the commemoration of Heroes’ Day in November 1988, the Governor of East Java, Soelarso, inaugurated 4 plaques located on the west and east side of Tugu Pahlawan (Heroes Monument), in front of the Governor’s old building and PDAM (Local Water Supply Company) which located on Jalan Basui Rachmat. The plaque explains that at the location, used to lay Raad van Justitie building and the site of a battle between Indonesian fighters and Japanese soldiers.

The inscription written on the old office building reads that Bung Karno held negotiations there, and also a place where Governor Suryo rejected the ultimatum from the Allies. Meanwhile, the inscription at PDAM building explains that the building used to be the headquarters of People’s Security Corps (BKR) that was led by Sungkono, (Anonim, 1988, hlm. 9).

Various kinds of commemorations, monuments, statues, plaques that Suharto constructed always contain nationalist messages, but these messages sometimes coexisted with other messages, such as development messages, communist atrocities messages and message regarding military’s significant role in preserving Indonesia. This means monuments, commemorations and statues that Suharto erected aimed to deliver varieties of messages compared to some of the collective memory instruments that were built by Sukarno.

The purpose of memorizing the Battle of Surabaya	Sukarno	Suharto
To build national identity	Nationwide and international scale	Nationwide scale
To highlight military roles	The role of military and certain individuals was not highlighted	The role of military was more highlighted
To deliver the messages of development	No	Continued carrying the messages of development
To convey the atrocities of communists	No	The atrocities of communists are conveyed through the construction of statues and Governor Suryo Bridge

Table 1. The differences of the purpose of memorizing the Battle of Surabaya between Sukarno and Suharto

Things forgotten about the Battle of Surabaya

As a newly independent nation, the memory of defending independence is crucial to build national identity and legitimizing the existing of Indonesia. Therefore, the construction of the memory is based on the narrative of *us versus them* (Indonesia fighting against the Allies). Monuments, statues, museums and various representations are constructed to preserve the memory of fighting against the Allies. If not, the memory is used to depict the atrocities committed by the Allied soldiers toward the Indonesian fighters. Things were considered incompatible with the interests of the rulers in building national identity by deliberately omitting, or possibly, concealed tightly (Assmann, 2008, hlm. 64 & 67; Gross, 2002, hlm. 342). As regimes monopolized the formation of collective memory, both Sukarno and Suharto purposely carried out such forgetting. Suharto even stated it openly when attending the launch of the National Movement for the Preservation and Practice of Cultural Values at the Heroes’ Monument in 1995, Suharto mentioned, “the bad things should not be brought up to highlight the flaws of our parents” ((O.D.Y, 1995, hlm. 1)

Because those in power have purposely forgotten the episodes in the Battle of Surabaya, the comprehension regarding the event is incomplete. There are several things that are yet to be understood because they have never been transmitted through monuments, statues and museums. Consequently, the absence of this transmission has led to a collective amnesia among people (Bijl, 2012, hlm. 443). There are some events in the Battle of Surabaya that have been deliberately forgotten to induce collective amnesia.

Firstly, the forgetting of the atrocities committed by Independence fighters. According to Cribb, Frederick and Wahid, those who carried out the killings to civilians was not only by the Dutch but also by Indonesians. Groups affiliated in the Youth of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemudak Republik Indonesia) and People's Security Corps committed assault to men, women, even the children descendent of Eurasians. Before being murdered, Eurasians will be abused, forced them to take off their underwear and wrote 'NICA' on their back. They were also beaten. Few were later died because they could not withstand the torture. One of the most traumatic experience within the Eurasians were when they saw women's breasts being cut open and their genitals being pierced with a bamboo (Abdul Wahid, 2013; Cribb, 2008, hlm. 425; Frederick, 2012, hlm. 363 & 364).

Violence and killings of the Eurasians was occurred in Kalisosok prison and Simpang Club. However, no monuments or markers have ever been erected at both sited to commemorate atrocities against Eurasians because it considerably would undermine the narratives that our ancestors were heroes while the Allies were cowards (Michael Rothberg, 2009, hlm. 5). Thus, the forgetting of the atrocities was not because the memory of the violence has truly disappeared, but because the authorities have failed to accommodate and memorialize these events (Bijl, 2012, hlm. 443 & 453; Michael Rothberg, 2009, hlm. 5). Moreover, the victims of the murder did not reside in Indonesia any longer so their voices were unheard. However, even if they resided in Indonesia, there is no guarantee that their voices would have been heard, as the strongest holder of the memory was in the hands of the authorities. When the victims of revolutionary violence still stayed in Indonesia like the Chinese or Ambonese, they were unable to build a counter memory of the narratives as well as the authorities (Abdul Wahid, 2013; Adrian Vickers, 2011, hlm. 152).

The government itself preferred to avoid and run from dark memories eather than accept it as a lesson (Raben, 2012, hlm. 494). It is no wonder that the dark memories that Eurasians experienced is preserved more in Netherlands rather than in Indonesia. In Netherlands, memorizations of the violence experienced by Eurasians is passed through various writings, one of it is *Eurasian Dilemma in Indonesia* by Paul W. Van Der Veur that was published in 1960. Through his writing, Paul W. Van Der Veur explains that men, women and children of Eurasians during the revolutionary period became victims of the Indonesian armed forces (Van Der Veur, 1960, hlm. 49). At that time, those kinds of writing were uncommon in Indonesia because indonesia tried to

create a history narratives that was Indonesia-centric, where displaying the crimes of Indonesian fighters was not the main focus.

Secondly, the forgetting of the non-aligned movement between the center and region. According to Ruslan Abuldghani as the person who directly involved in the battle, there were youths that went along with the center and also there were not. When the Minister of State, Sartono, came to Surabaya, he was confronted by young men who pointed a gun at him and said, "What is the central government? It means nothing." (Roeslan Abdulgani, 1981, hlm. 67–68). Additionally, according to Ricklef, Sukarno's decision by accepting the offer from the Allied to ceasefire led some revolutionary young men distrusted him any longer (Ricklefs, 2008, hlm. 225).

The existence of such differences and internal conflicts was hardly mentioned in the narratives of historiography because it would disrupt the narrative that Indonesian cooperatively fought together to defend independence, a narrative that continuously being produced to increase nationalism (Gerry van Klinken & Maarten van Der Bent, 2023, hlm. 141).

IV. CONCLUSION

This research shows that, even the narrative of nationalism has always been attached, the construction of collective memory of the Battle of Surabaya was heavily influenced by the interests of those in power of its time. Sukarno constructed the memory of the battle of Surabaya to build civic awareness and the identity of Indonesia worldwide. He constructed the memory through Heroes' Monument and the commemoration of Heros' Day. On the other hand, Suharto constructed the memory of the Battle of Surabaya to deliver the message of development, highlighted military roles and preserved the narrative of atrocitis committed by communist party. Suharto preserved this memory through various forms, such as statues, monuments, text books, plaques and curriculum. In both Sukarno and Suharto'e era, the construction of collective memory was accompanied with selective process. Aspects that were considered disrupting the narratives of nationalism and national identity were deliberately omitted, such as the lack of unity between the movements in the center and region also the stories of violence perpetrated by revolutionary fighters against civilians, children and Eurasian women. This selection process aimed to maintain the image of homogenous heroism and to avoid the memory that could damage the narrative of ideal struggle. thus, collective memory of the Battle of Surabaya does not only function to recollect past struggles, but also as a politic instrument that the authorities used to legitimate their own interests and power. The deliberate process of forgetting against certain aspects in history showed how memories can be manipulated according to dominant ideology in the running period. The memory of the Battle of Surabaya that was constructed in these two periods reflect that not only collective memory about the struggle of independence, but also politic interests which determined the creation of natinal identity.

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