

TRACKING ON MODERATE MUSLIM IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

This study focuses on tracking the dynamics of Indonesian conversations on moderate Islam thought. It attempts to answer number of questions concerning with the base and background of moderate Islam in developing its ideology between fundamentalism and liberalism pattern, form and typology and the development of moderate Islam movement in Indonesia. For this objectives, this study examines the role of the moderate Islam institution in Indonesia. This study shows that Muslim thinkers have made some of the greatest intellectual and theoretical contributions to the debates over Islam and human rights, Islam and democracy, and Islam and women's rights. This position is in line with the state concerns. This means that Moderate Islam in Indonesia has provided the foundations of civil society that made the transition to democracy possible whereas in the Middle East Islam has been seen as anathema to democratization.

Key Words: *Moderate Islam, Islam Movement in Indonesia*

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of Islamic resurgence found its momentum in the attack of World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001. The US government, in particular, has alleged that Islamic resurgence is part of international terrorist networks. It believed that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda were behind the attack. As a result, it began to link the al-Qaeda network with Islamic movements and certain Muslim figures in Asia. In Indonesia, this allegation was justified by the Bali bombings of Bali, of the Marriot Hotel, and of the Australian embassy, which were believed to connecting with radical Muslim activists.

In spite of the complexity of the action, some scholars believe that it is useful to use certain labels to identify and explain the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world. This labeling can be considered as a comparative construct encompassing movement within (various) religious tradition. William Liddle, for example, uses the term 'scripturalist Islam'

to identify the views of *Media Dakwah*, one of the leading Islamist magazines in Indonesia. For Liddle, scripturalist Muslims are "those who do not see themselves as engaged primarily in the intellectual activity of adapting the message of Muhammad and the meaning of Islam to the social conditions of the late twentieth century" (Liddle 1996:329). Others prefer to use "militant Islam" to explain the phenomenon of hard line Muslim groups in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. In the light of the security approach, they regard the groups as those who oppose the existing governments and even break laws in order to achieve their goals (Yunanto 2003:13).

Beside the above mentioned terms, Islamic radicalism or radical Islam has been frequently used by scholars in explaining hard line Muslim groups in the Muslim world. Within Indonesia context, there are scholars who employ the term to identify the groups. According to Zada (2002:124) and Rahardjo (2002:54), the term is derived from a social science concept of radicalism as popularized by Horace M. Kallen.

For Zada, hard line Muslim groups in Indonesia can be regarded as radicals for several reasons. Firstly, they tend to see Islam as a total system (*kaffah*) and therefore Islam should become the basic foundation of the state as well as Sharia for the national law. Secondly, their religious understanding and practices refer to the past (*salafi*). Thirdly, they reject ideas imported from the West such as secularization and modernization. Fourthly, they oppose and condemn ideas developed by Muslim liberals (Zada 2002:17). These components of Islamic radicalism are also shared by Jamhari and Jahroni. They add that in achieving their goals, radical Muslim groups are not reluctant to oppose the existing governments who are seen as *status quo* and ignorant to social illness (*ma'siat*). Moreover, the radical Muslim groups tend to be intolerant and even hostile to non-Muslims, notably Jews and Christians, who are seen as enemies conspiring to ruin Islam (Jamhari and Jajang 2004:6-8).

Undoubtedly, the rise of radical Islam has shaken the face of peace, tolerant, moderate, and modern Indonesian Islam. In this country, Islam constituted a model of how the religion developed within a wide variety of ethnic groups. Instead of pushing the local cultures aside; Islam opens up itself to them and incorporates them into the web of universal Islam. One can see how Islam is cultured within Malay, Batak, Java, and Bugis cultures (Azra 2000:44). Yet, as it is being localized, Indonesian Islam does not close itself to the global cultures and civilization. Its relationship with the Middle East, the homeland of Islam, is still well maintained and the new and fresh relationship with the West is also developed. Previously, graduates from Middle Eastern universities dominated the Islamic discourse in Indonesia, but now Western graduates are also

involved. As a result, Indonesian Islam has made a significant contribution to the development of global issues such as civil society, good governance, democracy, gender and human rights.

Moderate Islam has been a form of Islam that is actively promoted since the last decades. Although historically the terms of moderate, fundamental, and radical had emerged in Islamic studies for quite long time, the term Moderate versus radical-fundamentalist increased just after the terrorist attack in 2001, when Westerners started to realized and justified the radical as enemy and the moderate as companion (Asyari 2009:43). In Indonesia, the thought movement of moderate Islam is strengthened with efforts of local modern and traditional Islamic organizations, such as Center Muslim Moderate (CMM), The Wahid Institute of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), The Ma'arif Institute of Muhammadiyah and even Party of Wealth and Justice (PKS) and Tarbiyah movement that lately transformed its fundamentalism form to moderate movement also supported the efforts. This is in accordance with some Islamic Organization of South East Asia that also involved, such as in holding related confeneces promoted the peaceful of Islam.

This study focuses on tracking the dynamics of Indonesian conversations on moderate Islam thought, an important aspect of intellectual and broader public discussions in many Muslim societies. The main issue or question that the research sets out to address are; what is the base and background of moderate Islam in developing its ideology between fundamentalism and liberalism pattern; how is the form and typology of moderate Islam presented by scholars and Islamic movements; and how is the development of moderate Islam movement in Indonesia.

This study aims to analyze the development of moderate Islam in Indonesia. Subsequent, this study examines the role that each of these movement have suggested in the moderate Islam ideas such as PKS party and Tarbiyah Movement, Muhammadiyah, NU and other thing and movement which take moderate term in their movement. Research strategies were needed in order to get close to the community being studied. Qualitative technique were used, namely, semi-structured interview, direct observation, participant observation were employed for gathering information from different sources and perspectives. To complete the study, the writer will also done participant observation and in depth interview to local official, academicians, key persons, informal leaders. Triangulation involves use of different sources of information on the same topic, refers to use of known reference points (or known information) to determine the nature of unknown points (or unknown information (Lincoln and E.G.Guba 1985:142).

IDENTIFYING MODERATE ISLAM

In Islamic discourse Moderate Islam relates to the concept of *ummatan washatan* (intermediate people). This notion is explicitly stated in the Sūra of al-Baqāra (2):143 “And the above is true, we make you are intermediate people, so that, you become eyewitness to human being”. Maulana Muhammad Ali as quoted by Samson, explains the word *wasathan* derived from *wasat*, which based on *Dictionary of Arabic-English Lane Lexicon* means, part or midst of best, not extremely too there or too here (Rahman 2007:10). Meanwhile, Ahsin W. al-Hafidz from Samson defined *ummatan wasathan* as chosen people who are fair; it also means intermediate people that are middle in all

aspects of their life. It is not dreadful in keeping their faith, and so are behavior and their deed, and their perception of the world (Rahman 2007:11). Nurcholish Madjid, suggested moderate Islam as a group of society with moderate character, a core character of moderate people needed in facing various confrontations and conflicts caused by differences (Madjid 1998:43).

Moderate defines as “soft” and “in the middle”, “not accessive” (Echols and Hassan 1994:243). Moderate Islam can be defined as a concept of pliable Islam, not the extreme one. However, compared to liberal Islam, progressive Islam, revivalist Islam, and Islamic fundamentalism, the term of moderate Islam is vaguer to define in the world of Islamic movement in Indonesia. Although this kind of moderate movement has operated even before independence of Indonesia, such as in educational movement of Muhammadiyah compared to other war movement against colonialism, the use of the term was limited. It is because a movement of thought can only be identified moderate when compared to the radical ones. Therefore, the term moderate is not that easy to be simplified.

In this case, Greg Barton argues that Islamic movement in the New Order regime tended to be moderate, liberal, and progressive, especially in urban community. “... When Islam does not involved in political party of New Order regime... people considered this as a form of change from disaster to blessing... through rethinking of best ways of Islam in influencing and guiding its community” (Barton 1995:4). The term moderate in Barton’s does not point out the middle group in contrast to the radical-fundamentalist. He equally place the moderate term as progressive and moderate character. Although each has different tendency of meanings, he named them as Neo-

modernism, which usually used modern Western theories in explaining authoritative source of Islam. Therefore, moderate does not relate to the extreme of rationalism of liberal Islam and literalism of radical Islam or fundamental.

Recently, the term moderate Muslims are not only becoming important in the post September 11 discussion of Islam and the West, it is also becoming highly contested. However, the term moderate is often understood differently by different people. According to Graham Z. Fuller as quoted by Suaidi Asyari, moderate Muslims are those who opened to evolutionary ideas of changes in the history (Asyari 1999:34). They avoid literalism in understanding and practicing Islam, and being cautious in grasping the meaning of the holy text. Meanwhile, John L. Esposito suggests that moderate Muslims are those who live and work within a community, make an effort of changes from below, refuse to accept religious extremism and consider violence and terror as a sinful deed. They interpret and reinterpret Islam in order to be able to respond religious facts as well as social and political facts effectively in both local and international environment. Some attempt to attach Islamic values in their community (Esposito 2007:12).

Furthermore, John argues that efforts of Western scholar such as Graham Z. Fuller, Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes in defining moderate Islam depend on religious and political positions of the definition makers. They define moderate Islam within the fine surrounding of the United State and Europe (Esposito 2007:14). This is what makes Nur Manuty worries in that so far definition of moderate refers to the Western world which based on reductionism approaches in explaining Islam. He believed that moderate Islam comes from the strength of traditional form of learning Islam (Manuty 2007).

In Western literature, there are some questions to Islamic activists. According to Daniel Pipes, the best way to discern moderation is by delving into the record- public and private, Internet and print, domestic and foreign-of an individual or institution. Such research is most productive with intellectuals, activists and imams, all of whom have a paper trail. With others, who lack a public record, it is necessary to ask questions. These need to be specific, as vague inquiries ("Is Islam a religion of peace?" "Do you condemn terrorism?") Have little value, depending as they do on definitions (of *peace*, *terrorism*). And then Useful questions might include:

Violence: Do you condone or condemn the Palestinians, Chechens, and Kashmiris who give up their lives to kill enemy civilians? Will you condemn by name as terrorist groups such organizations as Abu Sayyaf, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Groupe Islamique Armée, Hamas, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and al-Qaida? Modernity: Should Muslim women have equal rights with men (for example, in inheritance shares or court testimony)? Is jihad, meaning a form of warfare, acceptable in today's world? Do you accept the validity of other religions? Do Muslims have anything to learn from the West? Secularism: Should non-Muslims enjoy completely equal civil rights with Muslims? May Muslims convert to other religions? May Muslim women marry non-Muslim men? Do you accept the laws of a majority non-Muslim government and unreservedly pledge allegiance to that government? Should the state impose religious observance, such as banning food service during Ramadan? When Islamic customs conflict with secular laws (e.g., covering the face for drivers' license pictures), which should give way? Islamic pluralism: Are Sufis and Shi'ites fully legitimate Muslims? Do you see Muslims who disagree with you as having fallen into unbelief? Is takfir (condemning fellow Muslims with whom one has disagreements as unbelievers) an acceptable practice? Self-criticism: Do you accept the legitimacy of scholarly inquiry into the origins of Islam? Who was responsible for the 9/11 suicide hijackings? Defense against militant Islam: Do you accept enhanced security measures to fight militant Islam, even if this means extra scrutiny of yourself (for example, at airline security)? Do you agree that institutions accused of funding terrorism should be shut down, or do you see this symptom of bias?

Goals in the West: Do you accept that Western countries are majority-Christian and secular or do you seek to transform them into majority-Muslim countries ruled by Islamic law? (Pipes 2003).

On the other hand, many Muslims consider moderates heretical. However, as explained earlier, this view springs from the extremists, as they are referred to in the mass media. According to Muqtader Khan moderate Islam is individuals aspire to live an ethical life because they recognize its desirability. Communities will compete in doing good and politics will seek to encourage good and forbid evil. They believe that the internalization of the message of Islam can bring about the social transformation necessary for the establishment of the virtuous city (Khan 2005).

They are moderate Muslims who believe that the Islamic faith is and should be a religion of peace. In fact, they are the silent majority. While the Islamic religion may be inherently violent, the fact is most people who follow Islam are peaceful. Why are not their moderate voices being heard (Khan 2005). Accordingly, director of CMM, Hilaly Basya considered that reading the text using modern perspective resulted in a form of authentic Islam which is relevant to the present (Basya 2009). At the same time, scholars of Islamism Neo-Modernist post 70s, such as Azyumardi Azra, argues that moderate Islam has been the original character of religiosity of Muslim in Indonesia (Azra 2009). He also often used the term of moderate Islam to explain a character of neo-modern Islam.

So, moderate Muslims are different from militant Muslims even though both of them advocate the establishment of societies whose organizing principle is Islam. The difference between moderate and militant Muslims is in their methodological orientation and in the

primordial normative preferences which shape their interpretation of Islam.

BACKGROUND OF MODERATE ISLAM

It is true that the emergence of moderate Islam is an antithesis of the radical Islam, particularly since discourse of war against terror emerged. In Indonesia, historically, the movement of radical Islam has been there since the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. One of the evidences has been the emergence of Padri movement which embrace was influenced a lot by Wahabism brought by pilgrimages returned from Saudi Arabia. This Padri-Wahabism movement in West Sumatra was a religious movement with radical tendency of purification of Islamic teaching from traditional influences (Rais 1994:20). With their reform the Padris tended to be puritan and literalistic in understanding Islam. They also fought against colonialism as a religious expression of *jihad* against those *kafirs* that colonized their land, besides expected freedom.

After the independence, emerged radical Islam movement with attachment of political dimension. In the end of 1940s, for instant, there was rebel and military battle led by Kartosuwirjo that refused the formation of state of newly freed Indonesia. That battle was on behalf of religion aimed to construct an Islamic state (*dawlah Islamiyah*) in Indonesia. This was the generic of *Dār al-Islām* (DI, or Islamic state of Indonesia) movement and *Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII (Indonesian Islamic Army). However, although the insurgent that had its center in West Java and had spread out in South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Aceh in the midst 1950s, this movement did not get much support from the majority Muslim of Indonesia. They have

struggled against colonialism and accepted Pancasila as a national ideology, a social contract that admits religious heterogeneously and rejects formalization of Islam in the state of Indonesia. The insurgence finally came to an end in 1962 (Hiroko 2004:59-76).

During the New Order regime, there was no significant radical movement appeared but some were hidden. A study by Jazilus Sakhok in 1993 explained that a new radical movement known as *Jamaah Islamiyyah* (JI) has been constructed. They claim as the next generation of *Dār al-Islam* or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI/TII) to build an Islamic state. However, JI has a more militant style and go through a more radical way. Most of its member is ex-volunteers of *mujahidin* involved in the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan between 1980s and 1990s (Sakhok n.d).

Beside that, there are typology of neo-modernism, which emerged as prolong movement of classic-modernism with creative actions and dialogue that put intellectual approaches in the first place in response to modernity. According to Fazlur Rahman, who was considered the initiator of neo-modernism, the movement has a basic assumption that Islam should be involved in the force of modernism. Even it is expected that Islam will lead in the future. To achieve this goal established Islamic tradition should not have to be disappearing. This resulted in a postulate of *al-Muhafazbah 'ala al-qādim al-ṣālih wa al-akhdz bi al-jadid al-aṣlah* (maintaining the good of the old, and taking the new that is better) (Effendi and Fachri 1986:176). Neo-modernism attempted to combine modernism and traditionalism. Modernism is not one that should be denied, nor traditionalists' thought. The two order of thought should be able to walk together.

In Indonesia, some of prominent figures of neo-modernism are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. They are influenced by thoughts of Fazlur Rahman, the *guru* of Islamic thought at the University of Chicago. Greg Barton said that the influence is clear in Nurcholish Madjid's thoughts (Barton 1995:6). To answer issues of Islam in context of Indonesia, according to Nurcholish, it is important to dare in rethinking established Islamic teaching from the holy sources of the Quran and Hadits as a form of social interaction in the history (Madjid 1998:76).

Salafism also develops within Islamic movement. Salafism means as a transnational movement which aims to propagate the puritanical approach to Islam and connect the members of an "imagined community" of true believers all over the world. Though its actual members cannot be accurately estimated, the Salafi movement is one of the fastest-growing Islamic movements, which spreads virtually to all countries. Its contemporary presence can be seen in various parts of the world including Middle East, Southeast Asia, Australia, Europe, and America. The development of the modern Salafism owes mainly to the supports, ideologically and financially, of the Gulf countries, particularly Arab Saudi, which have played as the major producers and exporters of Salafi publications, Salafi propagation, and humanitarian aids (Hasan 2009:29-55). In contrast with other Islamic movements, Salafism is not organized within a particular Muslim organization as it does not operate under the leadership of a particular figure in a highly structured organization. The supporters of Salafism are not united by an organizational structure or directed by a particular leader or ideologue. Rather, they united and consolidated by the shared Salafis identities. By identity, I mean

a system of beliefs, ideas, values and meanings that reflects moral, social and political interests and commitments of the Salafis and constitutes their ideology of how the world should work. As Van Dijk cited in Noorhaidi asserts, ideology “represents a group’s identity and interests, defines its collective cohesion and organizes joint action and interactions that optimally realizes the group’s goals” (Hasan 2007:132).

This study suggests that the emergence of moderate Islam has been a long accumulation in the history of intellectual movement in Indonesia. It is not only about intellectual debates through typologies mentioned above, but also about the fact that in the matter of movement in Indonesia have extensively developed polarization of movement as the implementation of the above designs. Accordingly, ideas of moderate Islamic movement are essentially going on with several typologies of movement existed before, particularly neo-modernism. What is more is that moderate Islam was born in a different age, different context and challenge. The very core idea of moderate Islam was resulted from fundamental movements on behalf of Islam. This movement also elaborated Islamic teaching to answer contemporary issues such as democracy, violence, gender, human right, pluralism, good governance, civil society, and issues about Islamic state.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE MODERATE ISLAM

While fundamentalism and radicalism hold their own characteristic in developing their movement and ideology, moderate Islam should also have its different characteristic of its movement. Those differences generally relate to interpretation of Islamic sources such as the Quran and the use of *Sunnah* (prophetic

traditions). In addition, understanding of *ijtihad*, and opportunity of current *jihad* has also been an issue relates to flexibility of Islam in facing today’s social problems. This part of writing elaborated characteristic of movement and thoughts of moderate Islam based on the above aspects.

Interpretating the Quran

An Abrogation (*nasakh*) is acknowledged as one of valid methods in the interpretation of the Quran. This notion means that if there is text that appears to contradict another, the chronologically earlier text is considered null and void, or abrogated. For Muslims, abrogation is not taken lightly. A verse was abrogated by a command from God to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel to announce the cancellation of one verse by replacing it with another (Saed 2006:75). Over the course of Muslim intellectual history, the study of *tafsir* had developed a number of sub-disciplines to facilitate the process of deriving relevant interpretations from the sacred text. One of these sub-fields that has come to be of considerable importance for many modern reformers is that of *al-nāsikh wal-mansukh*, or “that which abrogates, and that which is abrogated” (al-Suyūṭiy 1981:700-723). The principle of abrogation (*naskh*) has thus become a productive means by which apparent contradictions in the texts of revelation are reconciled by determining their relative chronological ordering.

On the other hand, some religious scholars believe abrogation was a human invention to resolve inconsistencies in the Hadith. But in doing so, they had to apply the same rule to the Quran. However, since they assert that in fact there are not inconsistencies in the Quran they claimed, instead that the abrogated verses are grossly misunderstood and misinterpreted (Muhamad

2008). This new understanding of abrogation has gained very little acceptance as it is contested by mainstream interpretations that have existed for centuries and is considered heretical to most.

Many Muslims have considered moderates as heretical. However, as explained earlier, this view springs from the extremists sides, as they are referred to in the mass media. In fact, these extremists are fundamentalists, traditionalists or literalists. Just as most faiths have their fundamentalists, such as the Evangelical Christians, or the Orthodox Jews, so does Islam. Where many Christians have moved away from the literal interpretation of the Bible, this concept is heresy to a faith that considers the Koran the literal word of God (Warraq 2003:11). Irshad Manji, in her book, *The Trouble with Islam: A Wake-up Call for Honesty and Change*, says "that every faith has its share of literalists...But what this book hammers home is that only in Islam is literalism mainstream" (Pipes 2003:21). And only in Islam does literalism call for a global caliphate achieved by any means possible.

In this light, where do we find moderate Muslims? Ibn Warraq makes the assertion that "no amount of mental gymnastics or intellectual dishonesty is going to make the unpalatable, unacceptable, and barbaric aspects of Islam disappear. At least the Islamic "fundamentalist" is being logical and honest, given the premise that the Koran is the Word of God" (Pipes 2003:23). However, the Muslim moderate is not trying to dispute the literal word of God. Instead, they use an alternative intellectual position to shape their interpretation of Islam.

Moderate Muslims often embrace the minority view of abrogation. According to Ahmad Suaedy interpretation towards the Quran must continually be understood in a new social-political and cultural context. However, substantial

principles and tradition attached in Islamic mission and the Quran must not be abandoned. Debates are natural, but they must be aimed for defending humanity (Ahmad Suedy, *Interview*, 23 July 2009).

Ijtihad

Ijtihad is defined as "individual reasoning, or in Islamic law, synonymous with freedom of interpretation and intellectual liberty" (Lippman 2002:187). *Ijtihad* is the Muslim practice of interpretation of the sacred texts by the use of reasoning. However, the Islamic faith no longer embraces or permits Muslims to practice *ijtihad*. This right was taken away 500 years ago. This has come to be known as "closing the gates of *ijtihad*." It was the practice of *ijtihad* that allowed Muslims to adapt to the ever-changing social environment. With the closing of the gates of *ijtihad*, the ulama became the guardians of dogma and entrenched legal formalism. This led to centuries of stagnation in Islamic thought and turned the development of Sharia from a process of intellectual reasoning to an instrument of "doctrinal absolutism controlled by precedent" (Lippman 2002:80).

Imam Hassan Oazwini Muzammil and his associates propose this practice be revived to reinterpret Islamic laws based on modern circumstances because limiting *ijtihad* has resulted in "intellectual stagnation" prohibiting *mujtahid* from offering workable solutions to newly emerging problems. *Ijtihad* should be applied to numerous issues today, including the role of women; the Sunni and Shiite conflict; globalization; capitalism and economics; unity among Muslim states and Muslims in non-Muslim countries. "Democracy is the key to opening up *ijtihad*, and *ijtihad* is the key to solving the principal problems confronting the Muslim world" (Siddiqi 2004:67).

The moderates have been trying and continue to try applying *ijtihad*. For moderate Muslims *Ijtihad* is the preferred method of choice for social and political changes and military *Jihad* the last option. For militant Muslims, military *Jihad* is the first option and *Ijtihad* is not an option at all. *Ijtihad* narrowly understood is a juristic tool that allows independent reasoning to articulate Islamic law on issues where textual sources are silent. The unstated assumption being when texts have spoken reason must be silent. But increasingly moderate Muslim intellectuals see *Ijtihad* as the spirit of Islamic thought that is necessary for the vitality of Islamic ideas and Islamic civilization. Without *Ijtihad*, Islamic thought and Islamic civilization fall into decay. As early as the eighth century, Abu Hanifa, founder of the oldest of the four schools of thought within Sunni Islam, believed that he had the authority to exercise *ijtihad*. He felt that the Quran gave him the authority to exercise his own judgment over which views between the Quran first, then the Hadith, to accept and which to reject (Saeed :49).

The tool moderate Muslims use *ijtihad*, as has been discussed above. Interestingly, Khan believes that both the moderate and militant Muslims seek to establish of societies where Islam is their guiding principle. However, they seek to achieve this goal differently. One through *ijtihad* as the “preferred method of choice for social and political change” with *jihad* as the last option; for the other, *jihad* of the sword is the first and only option.

Jihād

Recently *Jihad* is one of the most controversial word ascribed to the Muslim community since the campaign started against terrorism launched by the US and its allies after the September 11 attacks in 2001 which wrecked the symbols of American

victory: the World Trade Center and the Pentagon which were executed by Muslim terrorist. As expressed in a number of the Quranic passages, *Jihad* (literally means “struggle” or “striving”) has a board meaning ranging from fighting against the enemy, against evil and wickedness, or even against one’s own natural (*hawa*) desires in order to get closer to God.

The doctrine of *jihad* originates in Islamic jurisprudence and is based on the Quran which contain direct pronouncement on the fight against unbelievers and wiping out unbelief from the face of the earth in order to establish a moral and religious public order and thus justifies exercising force on behalf of religious or moral considerations. In this regard, the Quran uses two distinct term for military action: *qital* and *jihad*. *Qital* means as “fighting or attacking”, whereas *jihad* means “struggle” or “striving”. They usually followed by the phrase “fi sabilillah” (in the path of God). This may be compared to the tradition of just war found in Western European society during the middle Ages when criteria pertaining to when a war was permissible and what public authority was to decide on war were severely restricted (Abdul 2006:113).

“Islam is unique among the religions world in having a developed doctrine, theology, and legal system that mandates warfare against unbelievers” (Spencer 2005:43). There are more than 120 verses in the Quran that express ideas of peace and tolerance. However, there are more than 160 verses in the Quran that express ideas of *jihad*, war, or intolerance, and these verses have abrogated the peaceful verses. *Jihad* literally means struggle of striving. There are several kinds of *jihad*, such as jihad of the pen and jihad of the tongue. The primary meaning is physical combat and is commonly understood as war on behalf of Islam

These misconceptions exist, in part, because the moderate Muslims are a silent majority and the voice of the vocal, violent minority is roaring around the world. These violent leaders and terrorists are predominantly Arab, leading to the two misconceptions. Ideally, the various groups of moderate Muslims will join forces and make a concerted effort to find consensus and issue of *fatwas* (legal opinion) of their own. Ones that do not mandate violent *jihad* or death sentences against non-Muslims, but ones that counter and contradict the fundamentalist rhetoric.

The peaceful moderate Muslims are not willing to increase Muslim-on-Muslim violence. They are unwilling to accept their religion as inherently violent, despite their support (even if only by their inaction) for the violent minority. In this way, they get the best of both worlds. They remain largely at peace, surrounded by fellow Muslims. Of course, the majority of Muslims live in countries dominated by Islamic culture and the Islamic faith and intolerant of other religions. They live at peace while supporting the violent expansion of their “peaceful” Islamic religion.

ISLAM AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Social transformation in Islam is the full manifestation of the Will of Allah and the realization of His Pleasure. Furthermore no transformation in a Muslim society, be it in rural or urban areas, can be explained simply by means of categories such as class, class consciousness, class-struggle, or economics. “Islam does not confine itself merely to purifying the spiritual and moral life of man in the limited sense of the word, its domain extends to the entire gamut of life” (Maududi 1977:1).

When the Prophet arrived at Medina there was no legitimately constituted social authority. He set

up an authority, with due sanction from the various constituents of the Medinese population. He drew up a written constitution, federal in nature, and with multiple clauses to accommodate various groups and their interests. The document was the “political genius of its author, it was in a real revolution. The center of power shifted from the tribe to the community, included Jews and pagans as well as Moslems” (Nicholson 1969:171). The Islamic society of Medina was almost a system of confederated local government in which non-Muslims controlled and directed external and security affairs.

Transformation in Islam is basically Islamization—a process of integrating Islam’s fundamental values into the life of society. “Islam is a system for practical human life in all its aspects. This is a system that entails the ideological ideal—the convincing concept which expounds the nature of the universe and determines the position of man in this universe as well as his ultimate objectives herein” (Qutb 1978:5). Islam is a complete code of life and the success of an Islamic society here and Hereafter lies in the total compliance with the entire scheme of life envisioned by the Sharia.

When people are ready, transformation will take place in the rural societies through a mass-based reconstruction movement which will develop small “Islamic social laboratories,” units of peoples’ power, will, and work in which the people will run their own affairs according to the tenets of Islam. Thousands and millions of such Islamic laboratories centering on mosques will emerge, restructuring the established order. Next these decentralized but highly ideologically motivated, cohesive units will form a pattern of the ultimate *ummat al-Islam*; a nonviolent world community, based on the *din* of Allah.

Transformation of Muslim societies in rural or urban areas involves a rediscovery of social welfare,

civic function, and the mobilizing capacity of a mosque for any nonviolent action. The mosque brings men and women together, establishes the spirit of cooperation, creates dynamic social solidarity, furthers mutual understanding, generates the spirit of consultation, helps keep the society informed, and keeps the society dynamic.

The essential Islamic elements on which the concept of rural transformation for a nonviolent world is based are: the exclusive and absolute Sovereignty of Allah; the Sharia, being the paramount as well as the sole source of policy; the dignity and equality of man and woman; the authority being in the nature of a trustee of Allah; and *mutaqi* being at the helm of authority, exercising their power as *khalifa* of Allah on the basis of consultation. The transformed society of Islam will be a society of absolute justice, freedom and rights, peace and security, and sufficiency and work. It will aim at the ultimate unity of the *ummah* and of humanity at large.

Moderate Muslims aspire for a society – a city of virtue -- that will treat all people with dignity and respect. There will be no room for political or normative intimidation. Individuals will aspire to live an ethical life because they recognize its desirability. Communities will compete in doing good and politics will seek to encourage good and forbid evil. They believe that the internalization of the message of Islam can bring about the social transformation necessary for the establishment of the virtuous city. The only arena in which Moderate Muslims permit excess is in idealism.

MODERATE ISLAM MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

The finding of this study shows that organizations and thoughts of Moderate Islam

have a commitment to promote the peaceful of Islam, friendly, and toleration towards others. This movement of thought was born and grew up originally from modern as well as traditional Islamic movement in Indonesia such as The Wahid Institute of NU, the Maarif Institute of Muhammadiyah and Center Muslim Moderate (CMM) including Paramadina and PKS which have different background of thought movement. This section of writing elaborates those movements and thoughts in relation to its category of moderate such as in terms of using moderate term in their movement or thoughts, at least.

Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM)

Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM) is a study center of Islam promoting that the religion is nonviolent and friendly. The center is founded to implement one of recommendation resulted by the Jakarta International Conference (JIC), held on 13-15 October 2003, attended by about 120 Muslim leaders of pesantren (NU and Muhammadiyah) all around Java and six delegates of Muslim scholars of the ASEAN member, including from Malaysia, Philippines, Cambodia, and Singapore. The CMM institution works under foundation of *Ummatan Washata*, which was formed by those involved in the conference in order to build moderate and civilized religious community (Basya, *interview*, 2 July 2009).

The fundamental objectives of CMM is to promote humanity, social justice, and democracy. Some intentions of this institution are; (1) As means of communication so that Muslim community can develop sense of brotherhood (*ukhuwah*) among them in Indonesia, and even in other part of the world, particularly in the ASEAN states; (2) To develop and promote Islamic thoughts and Muslim attitude that is moderate,

and friendly, while also halting efforts of religious and social fundamentalism; (3) To encourage Muslim generations of having wide outlook, progressive manner, and inclusive religious view; (4) To raise the passion of preaching Islam in forthcoming and peaceful way for all people of the world (Basya, *interview*, 3 July 2009).

Core ideas of the CMM formation have been dynamic changes of current age, which have influenced all parts of human life. Development of social and politics has made us regretful by its vague tactics. Many political policies of developed countries have caused many tragedy of humanity. Many countries such as Middle East, Afghanistan, Asia, and other part of the world are still experiencing severe pressure of unfair policies. As a result, many radical actions, violence and terrorism turn out everywhere.

This situation influenced the growth of Islam dynamic that is embraced by more than 1,3 billion people all around the world. Muslims were allegedly behind the 9/11 tragedy, Bali blast on October 2002, and several insurgencies. Consequently, there have been impacts and negative images to nonviolence Islamic preaching which usually underwent by many Muslim scholars. Respectable ideal of developing moderate society (*Ummatan Washata*) has had pediment due to excessive policies certain influential countries on the one hand, and radical actions of a small group of Muslim people on the other hand. Therefore, Muslim leaders and scholars as an important part of society have significant role in showing the truth of Islam that is friendly and nonviolence. They also have obligation to share positive and moderate point of views in order to limit the growth of radicalism. In this uncertain world, what is needed is the pleasant of Islam, not the anger of Islam.

In other words, agenda of moderate Islam in CMM perspective relates to the efforts of building mutual understanding between civilizations. Conflicts of Islamic world and the West must be bridged, and radical tendencies of some group of Muslim must be solved. A peaceful and civilized world can only be made by approaches of dialogues and mutual understanding. In Indonesia, Nahdhotul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are the most productive Islamic organizations in promoting dialogues among its own Muslim community in order to dam the wave of radicalism (Taher 2004:20). The charm of *jihad* with injustice policy of Western countries towards Islamic countries may result in the emergence of a 'negative goodness'. It is that empathy to the injustice is good, but using terror to the wide community is a violation towards humanity. In this context, perception that moderate Islam is merely an anti terror movement is understandable.

The Wahid Institute

The Wahid Institute was established on 7 September 2004, as a research centre that uses the name of former president Abdurahman Wahid. The institute focuses on culture and Islamic studies aimed to actualize moderate and open-minded Islam inspired from intellectual principles and aspiration of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). The Institute aims to explain current world situation which is haunted by violence as the threats of terrorism. It initiates to take cooperative actions in the form of inter-religious dialogue, as well as national and ethical dialogue, as a religion play crucial roles in the process of social development (www.thewahidinstitute.or.id).

The Institute argues that in Indonesia Islam has become one of the most important elements of the social development process.

Abdurrahman wahid as quoted by Greg Barton argued that Islam contributes to the acceleration of democratic process and empowerment of civil society but it may also become the stumbling block of the process. Islam had given important contributions to civilization, but often its images are overshadowed by negative perceptions. Thirst of knowledge that encouraged al-Ghazali to take a journey from Mecca to Damascus is no longer a trait of Islamic culture. The Medina Charter which was a landmark of pluralism is altered with exclusivity. Intellectual journey which inspired great philosopher Ibn Sina to seek answers to fundamental questions is sidelined by narrow-minded attitude (Barton 1995:34).

Now they are challenged to ponder why Islam which in the past had important contributions to civilization is now sinking and struggling to find a way out of trouble. In Indonesian context, a country with largest Moslem population, Indonesian Moslems share responsibilities to bring back Islamic past glories. Trough close cooperation with other element of societies we, in The Wahid Institute, are keen to achieve the ideal objectives and in Gus Dur's ideas and thinking, particularly in his strong commitment for democracy and pluralism, we find the foundation to achieve the objectives (Suaedy, *interview*, August 2009).

The pluralistic and democratic system requires transformation not only in political system but also in religious understanding and practices which put emphasis on humanity. That is all the great challenge that we are facing right now. The Wahid Institute wants to take apart the process of empowerment of civil society, social transformation and reinterpretation of religious thinking and we will do so without neglecting welfare of the people. There is a principle that we have to strongly adopt and the principle is freedom

and independency, both in thinking and actions. There are indications that press freedom will be curtailed and we are very concerned with that.

The Wahid Institute is committed to the exchange and dissemination of progressive Muslims thought to promote tolerance and understanding in the world. In particular, the institute is committed to developing a dialogue between the highest spiritual and political leaders in the West and Muslim world. **There are some programs of the Wahid Institute;** (1) **Campaign on Islam, pluralism and democracy** by facilitating communication and cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim scholars concerning Islam and Muslim society and as well as Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism and local culture by such means as publishing websites, holding discussion and conference, and producing briefing on strategic issues; (2) **Publishing and Library** to support the publication of strategically important endeavors. It also seeks to translate English and Arabic material into *Bahasa* and vice versa. The institute intends to build a Muslim library that will serve for Muslim activists, scholars, and researchers. Abdurrahman Wahid's personal work and library will form the nucleolus of this collection; (3) **Capacity Building for Progressive Muslims Network** by mapping Muslim NGOs and individuals to build an accurate and complete picture of the key elements of Islamic civil society in Indonesia. Key contacts and interest information will be assembled into a comprehensive database to promote the development of a network of likeminded individuals and groups; (4) **Education** promising young men and women from across the country with basic textual skill in Islamic studies will be selected to undergo an intensive period of training for 5-6 months where they will live and interact

under one roof, learning from a curriculum of progressive Muslims thinking devised by the Institute (www.thewahidinstitute.or.id).

The Maarif Institute

Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity (2002) has set its basic commitment to Islamic culture, humanity, and sense of Indonesian country. Those three areas have been the most important themes throughout the intellectual journey of Ahmad Syafii Maarif, former General Head of Muhammadiyah and the former President of the World Conference on Religion for Peace (WCRP). Along with Ahmad Syafii Maarif, some prominent figures involved in the foundation of the Institutes, such as Haedar Nashier, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Jeffrie Geovannie, Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mul Khan, Clara Juwono, Deddy Julianto Luthfi Assyaukanie, Sudibyo Lapidus, M. Dani Pratomo (Maarif, *interview*, 24 June 2009).

Maarif Institute has connection with the current reform movements of Islamic thinking (*Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam*, PPI). The reform movement has been regarded as the necessity of history. The complicated humanity problem of the modern age and many contemporary issues of democracy, human right, pluralism, gender, and intra-religious dialogue are in need of new explanation and understanding of Islamic teaching. Programs of Maarif Institute have linked to Muhammadiyah, although there is no formal connection with this organization. Many regarded Muhammadiyah as representation of moderate-modernist movement in Indonesia that vigorously promotes Islamic thinking, as well as social actions. In this case, the Maarif Institute with its reform movement has strengthened enlightenment process and empowered moderates in Indonesia.

Vision of The Maarif Institute is to be institution of thinking reform and of advocacy for Islamic values so that social justice and humanity can be actualized as life foundation of Indonesian people. Meanwhile, mission of the Institute is developing reform of Islam and bridging dialogue between different religions, culture, and civilization in order to actualize peace, understanding, and constructive relation for humanity. It also aimed to support fast process of democracy consolidation in Indonesia by strengthening and widening participation of civil society through advocacy of public policy (www.themaarifinsitute.or.id).

Vision of the Maarif Institute as Syafii Ma'arif thinking has different position amongst the guardian of pluralism. It is because, firstly, he represents a big 'tent' of Muhammadiyah; organization that is place to group of reformers (*Mujaddid*). This makes him different from Gus Dur, who has traditional background (*turatsniyyun*). Meanwhile, Cak Nur, who was influenced so much by modernism Fazlur Rahman, was academician. Unlike Gus Dur or Syafii Maarif, Cak Nur never led community organization. As academist, He has particular privilege compared to the other two. As leader of community organization there is more possibility of misunderstanding from public of organization they led, particularly when their view points differ from mainstream opinion. Opinion of both Syafii Maarif and Gus Dur about democracy, pluralism, equality and humanity often get criticized, even public denial (Maarif 1993:45). As leaders of big organization the two figures risk themselves to be unpopular for their choice of substantive and human values of Islam. Nevertheless, they have been noted in history of human value in Indonesia.

According to Maarif, moderate Islam believes that there are no other text places the same position of the ultimate and unrejected authority of the Quran. So that, the Quran is the key in seeking and understanding concept of religious pluralism in Islam. It can be briefly said, that the Quran regulates guidance for Muslim attitude in relation to other religious believers. Although not precise, there have been parallel views between Western ideas of pluralism and the Quran. It educates that different belief is not pediment to interact with other religious believers, nor reason for Muslim to turn out enmity. Religious pluralism emerged in Christian tradition, but the essence, value and basic principle and its practices even in a simple form had been there far before the Christian environment realizing it. The early history of Islam at the age of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions had been a period that inclusively admitted Islamic Sharia pluralism.

Tarbiyah Movement and PKS Party

PKS is an interesting phenomenon in Indonesia. Its educated cadres drawn mainly from university campuses lead a dedicated membership. Its low profile performance and non-violent strategies have raised it to become the sixth largest political party in Indonesia. Its peaceful orientation, yet its criticism of Western domination of the global political order have been apparent during its many demonstrations (Furkon 2004:54). PKS members have not hesitated to bring their families, including their small children, to their public demonstrations. "Bringing along children to a demonstration is an obvious guarantee that it will be peaceful and safe. That is something that has been shown by the Prosperous Justice Party" (*Media Indonesia*,

15 September 2003). The emergence of such a new force of political Islam represented by PKS is on the surface a recent phenomenon; in fact it has had a long history in Indonesia, which will be elaborated.

After the collapse of the Soeharto regime, Jemaah Tarbiyah, as an informal social movement, decided to transform itself into a formal organization. This decision was taken when the movement had to choose whether to establish a mass organization, or a fully political party. The majority of members agreed to form a political party, named the Justice Party, Partai Keadilan (PK) accommodating all of Jemaah Tarbiyah's activities. PK was established on 28 July 1998 and publicly announced on 9 August 1998. Nurmahmudi Ismail, a PhD graduate from the American Texas A & M University, was elected as the party's first president (Damanik 2002:67). On July 2003, PK formally merged with PKS and Hidayat Nurwahid was the elected president. During the general elections of 2004 PKS succeeded in gaining 7.34% (8.325.020) of the total vote and this has placed its cadres in seats in the national and local parliaments. Nurwahid was chosen as Chairperson of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and left his position as president of PKS. On May 2005, Tifatul Sembiring, another former activist in campus predication was appointed as the new president of PKS (Furkon 2004:69).

Jemaah Tarbiyah's inclusive attitude to accommodate Muslims from various backgrounds and to invite them to follow its ideas has been heavily influenced by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers (Esposito 2007:195-198). Al-Banna's inclination towards accommodation in religious matters has influenced Jemaah Tarbiyah's stance in dealing with politics. Rather than

demonstrating any fundamentalist views, the ideas of Jemaah Tarbiyah have been channeled through PKS in “accommodative ways” that tend to downplay its ideology. Jemaah Tarbiyah’s practical attitude to religious and political issues has their historical origins during the years of Soeharto’s New Order. Instead of identifying themselves as a resistance group, the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah deliberately avoided open confrontation with the regime and kept their distance from domestic and political issues. The commitment of Jemaah Tarbiyah to non-violence within its mass events on the university campuses began to bear fruit when the regime introduced a policy of political openness, picking up momentum when the regime’s situation became critical and finally collapsed in 1998. Jemaah Tarbiyah was able to transform itself into a political party and to set up branches throughout the country (Rahmad and Mukhammad 2001).

As the backbone of PKS, Jemaah Tarbiyah has also actively implemented a proselytizing mission focused on improving Indonesian Muslims’ understanding of their faith. Inspired by a religious movement in the Middle East, the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, Jemaah Tarbiyah has played a role as the agent of religious reform and at the same time has embarked on political activities to present itself as a united force of *ummah* regardless of individual religious orientations within its ranks. In carrying out its reform, Jemaah Tarbiyah has shown an accommodative strategy in order to avoid religious disputes and resistance among Indonesian Muslims in general. They are, in the main, educated outside the traditional educational system and have taken different paths to learn about Islam. They now claim to struggle for the interests of an Islam undivided by the traditionalist and modernist dichotomy. The

concept of a universal and total Islam has become their religious framework and orientation. Within their image of themselves as Muslims they lean towards a global and universal Islam that brings together all different Muslim identities for the triumph of Islam.

They also promoted moderate Islam principles have references in Islam teaching, like principle of *ta'aruf*, deliberation, *mujadalah* pursuant to science, *ishlah*, *ta'awun* or being helpful and honest in good things. Samson Rahman argues that in a society, intermediate group referred to the moderate who does not behave extremely to the left and to the right. This is marked with the following indications: Firstly, in dealing with differences that may cause conflict and threat, they tend to approach the parties instead of confronting them, so that differences do not turn into new conflict. Secondly, in making a social change, they tend to go through recondition action or reform rather than radical movement and revolution. Because changing basic things in short or revolution usually involves violence and big sacrificial, while renewal require to be conducted step by step and in peace. Third, they believe that social-political transformation tend to be done step by step not all at once and in short time. Therefore, it does not generate confrontation. Fourthly, they believe that among parties that claim a particular truth, there is room of consensus or of compromise that will be beneficial to all side. Fifthly, lenient attitude (*tasamuh*) or pursuant to mutually understanding (*ta'aruf*) which mean ready to comprehend and accept differences of others, and do not merely claim that their party owns the only truth alone (Rahman :20).

CONCLUSION

Islam was the force that facilitated Indonesia's transition to democracy. Most Indonesians eschew literal interpretations of Islam and violence perpetrated in its name. Indeed, Muslim thinkers in Indonesia have made some of the greatest intellectual and theoretical contributions to the debates over Islam and human rights, Islam and democracy, and Islam and women's rights. Most Muslims in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, support the secular state, and only a small minority advocates the establishment of an Islamic regime governed by Sharia, or strict Islamic law. Even fewer advocate this through violence, although their numbers appear to be growing.

The famed anthropologist Clifford Geertz divided Muslims into three categories: *Santri*, *Priyayi*, and *Abangan*. The *Santri* represented a more Salafist Islam, but were a distinct minority compared to the *Priyayi*, whose Islamic faith was built upon very deep-seeded Javanese–Hindu culture and mysticism, and the *Abangan*, who's Islam, was also tied to pre-Islamic culture and beliefs. In the New Order era, the “*Santri*-ization” of Islam occurred as the *Priyayi* and *Abangan* tended to support secular institutions and culture.

Especially in Indonesia, Islam in Indonesia has always been defined by tolerance, moderation, and pluralism. In Indonesia Islam helped create the foundations of civil society that made the transition to democracy possible whereas in the Middle East Islam has been seen as anathema to democratization. Moderate Islam can offer design of Islam peaceful, lenient and can give a significant contribution to global issue. As a religious human being, Islam can't just was understood these less learning normatively. We really should find Islam form which an even made a significant contribution to global issue such as civil

society, good governance, democracy, gender and human right. In Indonesia Islam helped create the foundations of civil society that made the transition to democracy possible whereas in the Middle East Islam has been seen as anathema to democratization.

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